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No procedural topic has garnered more attention in the past fifty years than the class 
action and aggregation of plaintiffs. Yet, almost nothing has been written about aggregating 
defendants. This topic is of increasing importance. Recent efforts by patent “trolls” and Bit-
Torrent copyright plaintiffs to aggregate unrelated defendants for similar but independent 
acts of infringement have provoked strong opposition from defendants, courts, and even 
Congress. The visceral resistance to defendant aggregation is puzzling. The aggregation of 
similarly situated plaintiffs is seen as creating benefits for both plaintiffs and the judicial 
system. The benefits that justify plaintiff aggregation also seem to exist for defendant aggre-
gation—avoiding duplicative litigation, making feasible negative-value claims/defenses, 
and allowing the aggregated parties to mimic the non-aggregated party’s inherent ability to 
spread costs. If so, why is there such resistance to defendant aggregation?  
Perhaps, contrary to theoretical predictions, defendant aggregation is against defend-
ants’ self-interest. This may be true in certain types of cases, particularly where the plain-
tiff’s claims would not be viable individually, but does not apply to other types of cases, par-
ticularly where the defendants’ defenses would not be viable individually. These latter cases 
are explained, if at all, by defendants’ cognitive limitations. In any event, defendant self-
interest does not justify systemic resistance to defendant aggregation. Likewise, systemic 
resistance is not warranted because of concerns of weak claims or unsympathetic plaintiffs, 
the self-interest of individual judges handling aggregated cases, or capture by defendant 
interests. This Article proposes that to obtain the systemic benefits of defendant aggregation 
and overcome the obstacles created by defendant and judicial self-interest, cognitive limita-
tions, and capture, defendant aggregation procedures should use non-representative actions, 
provide centralized neutral control over aggregation, and limit aggregation to common is-
sues. This Article concludes with a modified procedure to implement these principles: inter-
district related case coordination. 
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   I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Suppose that Netflix offered a one-month free trial before a cus-
tomer was billed,1 but actually added a small additional charge to the 
first bill to cover tax owed for this “free” trial. If customers wanted to 
sue Netflix for deceptive trade practices, it would be unsurprising if 
they sought to sue collectively via voluntary joinder, a class action, or 
multi-district litigation and, absent a contractual provision, were 
permitted to do so.2 But what if Netflix discovered widespread viola-
tions of a provision of the Terms of Use prohibiting users from shar-
ing their passwords with people other than “household members?”3 
                                                                                                                  
 1. See Netflix Terms of Use, NETFLIX, https://signup.netflix.com/TermsOfUse (last 
visited July 25, 2014).  
 2. This is similar to AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011), where 
there was little doubt aggregation would have been possible absent a contractual provision 
requiring individual arbitration; indeed, it is exactly the likelihood of aggregation that led 
to the inclusion of the contractual provision. See Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: 
The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 
414 (2005). See generally Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litiga-
tion in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623 (2012) (discussing 
Concepcion and its aftermath).   
 3. Netflix’s terms of use permit sharing of passwords with “household members” but 
are actually ambiguous about sharing with non-household members. See NETFLIX, supra 
note 1. The hypothetical assumes that the Terms of Use include choice of law, choice of 
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Could Netflix aggregate its breach of contract claims and litigate 
against the consumers collectively? Both experience and most peo-
ple’s gut reactions suggest no.  
 This raises a puzzle. Why are multiple people harmed by the same 
defendant in similar ways considered an appropriate litigation group 
but multiple people harming the same defendant in similar ways are 
not? In theory, aggregation of similarly situated defendants offers the 
same benefits as aggregation of similarly situated plaintiffs: avoiding 
duplicative and potentially inconsistent litigation; promoting optimal 
deterrence by making negative-value claims (for plaintiffs) or defens-
es (for defendants) viable; and encouraging resolution on the merits, 
not litigation costs, by allowing the aggregated party to spread its 
costs in the same way that the non-aggregated party inherently can.4  
 Yet, efforts to aggregate similarly situated defendants across sev-
eral substantive areas have sparked widespread and vehement oppo-
sition from defendants, courts, and policymakers. Courts have reject-
ed joinder where “the plaintiff does no more than assert that the de-
fendants ‘merely commit[ted] the same type of violation in the same 
way’ ”5 and have even described efforts to aggregate similarly situat-
ed defendants as a “gross abuse of procedure.”6 Even Congress has 
weighed in, with one member describing defendant aggregation as an 
“abusive practice.”7  
 Defendant aggregation has been particularly controversial in pa-
tent litigation, where courts and defendants have resisted efforts by 
patent holders, particularly controversial patent assertion entities or 
“trolls,” to join unrelated companies with similar but competing 
products alleged to infringe the same patent.8 When the plaintiff-
friendly Eastern District of Texas permitted it, Congress passed  
a special statutory provision prohibiting joinder or consolidation for 
trial of unrelated accused infringers.9 Efforts by copyright holders  
of pornographic films to join dozens or hundreds of users of the inter-
net file sharing protocol “BitTorrent” have encountered similar  
                                                                                                                  
forum, and consent to jurisdiction provisions, though the actual terms of use include an 
individual arbitration provision like in Concepcion. See id. 
 4. See Assaf Hamdani & Alon Klement, The Class Defense, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 685, 
696-99 (2005); see also David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual 
Justice by Collective Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561, 563-64, 570-72 (1987) (describing rationales 
for aggregating plaintiffs). 
 5. Digital Sins, Inc. v. Does 1–245, No. 11Civ.8170(CM), 2012 WL 1744838, at *2 
(S.D.N.Y. May 15, 2012) (alteration in original). 
 6. Nassau Cnty. Ass’n of Ins. Agents, Inc. v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 497 F.2d 1151, 
1154 (2d Cir. 1974). 
 7. David O. Taylor, Patent Misjoinder, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 652, 703 (2013) (quoting 
157 CONG. REC. H4426 (daily ed. June 22, 2011) (statement of Rep. Bob Goodlatte)). 
 8. See generally id. 
 9. See 35 U.S.C. § 299 (Supp. V 2011); see generally Taylor, supra note 7. 
1014  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1011 
 
resistance,10 as has the music industry’s own copyright fight against 
internet file sharers and DirecTV’s campaign against individual  
signal “pirates.”11  
 Unlike the exhaustive scholarly consideration of plaintiff aggrega-
tion,12 only a handful of articles have addressed defendant aggrega-
tion.13 Entirely overlooked in this limited scholarship is the basic 
puzzle of defendant aggregation—that is, why aggregation of similar-
ly situated defendants has been so controversial in practice despite 
its theoretical benefits.14 This Article tackles this puzzle. The discon-
nect between the benefits defendant aggregation offers and the oppo-
sition it has encountered may result from an assumption that de-
fendant aggregation must take the procedural form most familiar 
from plaintiff aggregation—the class action—and a belief that the 
class action is problematic when absent defendants, not absent plain-
tiffs, are to be bound by a class judgment. This Article, however, is 
not an analysis of defendant class actions. Rather, it first steps back 
from the mechanics of aggregation and asks whether collective reso-
lution of claims against similarly situated defendants is desirable in the 
first place. Only then does it address the appropriate procedural mecha-
nism for achieving this collective resolution, whether already existing or 
newly developed for the specific needs of multi-defendant cases. 
 The Article proceeds in four main parts. Part II describes the 
background of aggregation generally and the puzzle of defendant ag-
gregation specifically. Part III looks at the puzzle from the defendant 
perspective and Part IV from the societal perspective. Defendants’ 
resistance to being aggregated is the easier of the two to understand. 
In many contexts defendants have strategic reasons to oppose being 
aggregated, including avoiding litigation that otherwise would not be 
brought and resisting the choice of the presumably self-interested 
plaintiff. On the other hand, defendants often overestimate the 
strength of these strategic concerns, and these strategic reasons do 
not even exist in certain contexts—particularly where the stakes are 
                                                                                                                  
 10. See, e.g., Sanne Specht, Judge Dismisses Film Company's Lawsuit Against Local 
Defendants, MAIL TRIBUNE (May 14, 2013, 2:00 AM), http://www.mailtribune.com/apps/ 
pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20130514/NEWS/305140311; Claire Suddath, Prenda Law, the Porn 
Copyright Trolls, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (May 30, 2013), http://www.businessweek. 
com/articles/2013-05-30/prenda-law-the-porn-copyright-trolls#p1. 
 11. See infra Part III.D. 
 12. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 1.02 reporters’ note to cmt. a,  
at 15 (2009).  
 13. But see infra notes 20–23. 
 14. Prior works either focus on the theoretical benefits to defendants and ignore the 
practical opposition from defendants, see Hamdani & Klement, supra note 4, or focus on 
the practical opposition from defendants and ignore the theoretical benefits to defendants, 
see Sean B. Karunaratne, Note, The Case Against Combating BitTorrent Piracy Through 
Mass John Doe Copyright Infringement Lawsuits, 111 MICH. L. REV. 283 (2012). 
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too low to justify an individual defense—which are explained, if at 
all, by defendants’ cognitive limitations.  
 Turning to the more interesting and important question of why 
aggregation of similarly situated defendants has faced systemic re-
sistance, Part IV first concludes that any negative effects defendants 
suffer from being aggregated should not trouble courts and policy-
makers, as they neither distort the substantive remedial scheme nor 
raise fairness concerns. They explain systemic resistance, if at all, 
based on “capture” by defendants’ interests. Although courts and pol-
icymakers may use de-aggregation as a way to police weak or disfa-
vored substantive claims, these problems are better addressed 
through other procedural mechanisms or substantive reform. Finally, 
while managing the complexities created by defendant aggregation 
may challenge an individual judge’s self-interest, it is not worse for the 
judicial system than repetitive or overlapping dispersed litigation.  
 Part V identifies three core features of an optimal procedure for 
aggregating similarly situated defendants: (1) a non-representative 
structure (i.e., not class actions); (2) control by a centralized body, not 
the parties or individual judges; and (3) aggregation only of common 
issues, not cases. Part V concludes by sketching a mechanism to im-
plement these principles: inter-district related case coordination, 
which is a hybrid of existing multi-district litigation and the related 
case procedures many federal district courts use to manage cases 
filed within a single district.  
II.   OVERVIEW OF DEFENDANT AGGREGATION 
 Scholars and policymakers have paid surprisingly little attention 
to aggregation of defendants in litigation.15 To some extent, this is 
because complex litigation scholarship focuses overwhelmingly on the 
class action and largely overlooks other means for aggregating par-
ties, like joinder (Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 19 and 20), consol-
idation (Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42), and multi-district litiga-
tion (28 U.S.C. § 1407).16 Recent efforts to aggregate defendants 
largely have been via these other procedural devices, not defendant 
class actions,17 and therefore have escaped the notice of many class-
action-focused scholars. Moreover, efforts to aggregate similarly situ-
                                                                                                                  
 15. Hamdani & Klement, supra note 4, at 689, 696. 
 16. See Robin J. Effron, The Shadow Rules of Joinder, 100 GEO. L.J. 759, 763-64 
(2012) (noting that analysis of joinder is mentioned largely as an afterthought to the dis-
cussion of mass tort class actions); Emery G. Lee et al., The Expanding Role of Multidis-
trict Consolidation in Federal Civil Litigation: An Empirical Investigation 5-7 (July 10, 
2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1443375 (summarizing limited literature on multi-district litigation). 
 17. RICHARD L. MARCUS & EDWARD F. SHERMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION: CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON ADVANCED CIVIL PROCEDURE 382 (3d ed. 1998). 
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ated defendants are uncommon compared to aggregation of similarly 
situated plaintiffs,18 though they are becoming more frequent as 
mass communications allow dispersed people to cause the same inju-
ry to the same person in the same way.19  
 The leading work on aggregating similarly situated defendants is 
a paper by Professors Assaf Hamdani and Alon Klement in which 
they argued that the same justifications for plaintiff aggregation ap-
ply to defendant aggregation and proposed a procedure by which de-
fendants could initiate a defendant class action.20 A subsequent arti-
cle by Nelson Netto, largely tracking Hamdani and Klement, con-
tended that defendant classes were an important “functional device 
for the defendants” and proposed mandatory defendant class actions 
without opt-out.21 More recent work by Francis Shen developed in 
more detail the theoretical case for defendant class actions, arguing that 
the device can maximize social welfare.22 In contrast to this theoretical 
work, several scholars, practitioners, and students have described ef-
forts by plaintiffs in specific substantive contexts to aggregate defend-
ants and the resistance of defendants, courts, and policymakers.23  
 These conflicting lines of scholarship neatly illustrate the puzzle 
of defendant aggregation, which is laid out in more detail in this 
Part. Section A provides a background of aggregation procedures 
generally and Section B of defendant aggregation specifically. Section 
C describes the theoretical argument for aggregation of similarly sit-
uated defendants, and Section D describes the widespread resistance 
it has faced. 
                                                                                                                  
 18. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 1.02 reporters’ note to cmt. 
b(1)(A), at 17 (2009); id. § 1.02 reporters’ note to cmt. b(1)(B), at 23; STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, 
FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION 58 (1987). 
 19. Hamdani & Klement, supra note 4, at 741. 
 20. Hamdani & Klement, supra note 4, at 699 (discussing the similarities between 
numerous plaintiffs and numerous defendants and benefits to defendants from being  
aggregated). A few previous articles touched on defendant aggregation while focusing on 
plaintiff aggregation. Howard M. Erichson, Informal Aggregation: Procedural and Ethical 
Implications of Coordination Among Counsel in Related Lawsuits, 50 DUKE L.J. 381,  
401-08 (2000). Defendant class actions also have received some attention in student  
notes and practitioner articles. See, e.g., Robert R. Simpson & Craig Lyle Perra, Defendant 
Class Actions, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1319 (2000); Notes, Defendant Class Actions, 91 HARV. L. 
REV. 630 (1978).   
 21. Nelson Rodrigues Netto, The Optimal Law Enforcement with Mandatory Defend-
ant Class Action, 33 U. DAYTON L. REV. 59, 67, 97-101 (2007). 
 22. Francis X. Shen, The Overlooked Utility of the Defendant Class Action, 88 DENV. 
U. L. REV. 73, 74 (2010). 
 23. See, e.g., Annemarie Bridy, Is Online Copyright Enforcement Scalable?, 13 VAND. 
J. ENT. & TECH. L. 695 (2011) (copyright); Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Intellectual 
Property Defenses, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1483 (2013) (intellectual property); Taylor,  
supra note 7 (patent); Tracie L. Bryant, Note, The America Invents Act: Slaying Trolls, 
Limiting Joinder, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 687 (2012) (patent); Karunaratne, supra note 14, 
at 286-87 (copyright).  
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A.   Aggregation Procedures 
 Federal procedural mechanisms have been the focal point for de-
bate over defendant aggregation.24 The most famous of these mecha-
nisms is the class action, which is a representative action by which 
one or more people can sue on behalf of a class of similarly situated 
individuals, provided the many threshold requirements of Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 23 are satisfied: sufficient class size; common 
question of fact or law; adequacy and typicality of the representative; 
etc.25 Class actions bind all individuals that meet the class definition, 
even if not actual parties to the litigation.26 Hundreds of class actions 
are filed in federal court every month,27 and they have been subject to 
substantial political, public, and scholarly scrutiny.28 Although Rule 
23 purports to apply equally to plaintiffs and defendants, defendant 
classes are virtually non-existent.29 
 Aggregation occurs less famously but more commonly by joining a 
person as a party in the same lawsuit.30 Joinder actions only bind the 
individuals to the litigation; at least in theory, each individual party 
retains control over its separate claims, defenses, and rights.31 Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 19 describes when a plaintiff must join 
other parties,32 while Rule 20 gives the plaintiff discretion to do so in 
other circumstances.33 Rule 24 describes when a third-party can “in-
tervene” or join itself to a lawsuit,34 while Rule 14 permits the de-
fendant to “implead” or add a third party that is liable for the claim 
made against the defendant.35 Finally, Rule 22 allows a party to “in-
                                                                                                                  
 24. Aside from formal aggregation in federal court, aggregation can occur: (1) in state 
court under procedures similar to federal aggregation procedures; (2) inherently when cor-
porations or voluntary associations (e.g., unions) litigate on behalf of their members; (3) 
informally among counsel on the same side of related individual cases; and (4) via some 
substantive remedial schemes like bankruptcy. See Erichson, supra note 20; Judith Resnik, 
From “Cases” to “Litigation”, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 23, 28, 38-39 (1991). 
 25. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 26. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 1.02 cmt. b(1)(B), at 11 
(2009). 
 27. See Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, The Impact of the Class Action Fair-
ness Act on the Federal Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Filings and Removals, 156 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1723, 1750 (2008). 
 28. See Allan Erbsen, From “Predominance” to “Resolvability”: A New Approach to 
Regulating Class Actions, 58 VAND. L. REV. 995, 997 n.1 (2005) (collecting scholarship). 
 29. See Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Analysis of Rule 23 to Address the 
Rulemaking Challenges, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 119-20 (1996). 
 30. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 1.02 reporters’ note to cmt. 
b(1)(A), at 16 (2009). 
 31. Id. § 1.02 cmt. b(1)(A), at 11; id. § 1.02 reporters’ note to cmt. b(1)(A), at 18. 
 32. FED. R. CIV. P. 19. 
 33. FED. R. CIV. P. 20. 
 34. FED. R. CIV. P. 24. 
 35. FED. R. CIV. P. 14. 
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terplead” other parties that have claims exposing the party to double- 
or multiple-liability.36 These joinder rules generally apply to both 
plaintiffs and defendants.37 They normally are used to aggregate a 
small number of parties; though joinder of tens, hundreds, or thou-
sands is increasingly common, particularly in mass torts.38 Most 
mass joinders involve plaintiffs.39    
 The third type of aggregation is coordination or consolidation of 
individual lawsuits, which can occur for hearing, trial, or any other 
purpose via Rule 42(a) if all of the cases are pending in the same fed-
eral district40 or only for pre-trial proceedings (e.g., discovery, sum-
mary judgment, etc.) via the multi-district litigation statute, 28 
U.S.C. § 1407, if cases are pending in different federal districts.41 
 Aggregation occurs in two types of cases.42 First, many of the pro-
cedures only apply if individual adjudication could result in a prob-
lematic remedy, such as incomplete relief,43 exposure to double, mul-
tiple, or inconsistent obligations or liability,44 prejudice to a third 
party,45 or effective determination of an entire group’s rights.46 This 
type of remedy-driven aggregation has deep historical roots47 and is 
generally uncontroversial.48   
 Second, several procedures permit aggregation based only on vari-
ous levels of commonality among the claims. Permissive joinder  
under Rule 20 requires a common “question of law or fact” and that 
the claim “aris[e] out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of 
                                                                                                                  
 36. FED. R. CIV. P. 22. 
 37. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 1.02 reporters’ note to cmt. 
b(1)(A), at 16 (2009). 
 38. Id. § 1.02 reporters’ note to cmt. b(1)(A), at 16-17. 
 39. Id. § 1.02 reporters’ note to cmt. b(1)(A), at 17. 
 40. FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a). District courts often have procedures for designating cases as 
related and assigning them to the same judge or permitting intra-district transfer. See, e.g., 
U.S. DIST. CT. S.D. CAL. R. 40.1; U.S. DIST. CT. N.D. ILL. R. 40.4. 
 41. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012); see also Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes 
& Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998) (requiring remand to original district for trial).  
 42. See Effron, supra note 16, at 764, 819-21 (proposing similar division).   
 43. See FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a)(1)(A) (mandatory joinder); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 
14(a)(1) (interpleader). 
 44. See FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a)(1)(B)(ii) (mandatory joinder); FED. R. CIV. P. 22 (inter-
pleader); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A) (class action). 
 45. See FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a)(1)(B) (mandatory joinder); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B) 
(class action); FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2) (intervention). 
 46. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) (class action). 
 47. See YEAZELL, supra note 18, at 16, 58, 65. 
 48. But see MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 
AND THE PROBLEM OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT (2009) (suggesting that mandatory class 
treatment is inconsistent with individual autonomy but not challenging non-class aggrega-
tion in similar circumstances). 
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transactions or occurrences . . . .”49 A class action under Rule 23(b)(3) 
requires only a common question of law or fact but requires that the 
common question(s) “predominate over any questions affecting only 
individual members . . . .”50 Multi-district litigation under 28 
U.S.C. § 1407, consolidation under Rule 42(a), and permissive inter-
vention under Rule 24(b) permit aggregation based only on a common 
question,51 though courts tend to require a strong overlap before  
ordering aggregation.52  
 Commonality-driven aggregation was largely an innovation of the 
1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and amendments in the 
1960s.53 Coordination or consolidation is generally uncontroversial,54 
while permissive joinder has been described as both too restrictive for 
requiring an overlap in operative facts and too expansive for allowing 
mass joinders.55 Common question class actions under Rule 23(b)(3) 
are far more controversial: they have been accused of creating sub-
stantial exposure that encourages settlement of even meritorious de-
fenses;56 enriching plaintiffs’ lawyers with large fee awards while re-
couping trivial recoveries for class members;57 being inappropriate for 
substantive claims that are positive-value and rife with individual 
                                                                                                                  
 49. FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(1)(A)-(B); 4 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL 
PRACTICE § 20.05[3] (3d ed. 2013). 
 50. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). Common-question class actions 
must also be superior to other means for resolving the dispute. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1)-(4). 
 51. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012); FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b); FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a). The 
multi-district litigation statute only expressly includes “common questions of fact,” 28 
U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012), but consolidation has occurred based primarily on common legal 
questions or mixed questions of law and fact. See Stanley J. Levy, Complex Multidistrict 
Litigation and the Federal Courts, 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 41, 47-48 (1971). 
 52. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW: AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 1.02 reporters’ note to cmt. 
b(2), at 27-28; Effron, supra note 16, at 789-804 (suggesting courts normally apply predom-
inance standard when evaluating permissive joinder or consolidation). 
 53. See Robert G. Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of a Dispute: Conceptions of Ideal 
Lawsuit Structure from the Field Code to the Federal Rules, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 47-60 
(1989); Resnik, supra note 24, at 16, 29-32. 
 54. See 9A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 2381 (3d ed. 2008) (Rule 42(a)); Resnik, supra note 24, at 35 (multi-district 
litigation). Some say that limiting multi-district litigation to pre-trial proceedings is too 
constraining. See Resnik, supra note 24, at 35; see also Erichson, supra note 20, at 416. 
 55. Compare Douglas D. McFarland, Seeing the Forest for the Trees: The Transaction 
or Occurrence and the Claim Interlock Civil Procedure, 12 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 247,  
265-66 (2011) (stating that the free joinder of parties is encouraged), with PRINCIPLES OF 
THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 1.02 reporters’ note to cmt. b(1)(A), at 16 (stating 
that the rules of joinder “allow[] persons with related claims to join as coparties but [do] 
not requiring them to”). 
 56. Resnik, supra note 24, at 16. 
 57. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, 
Reality, and the “Class Action Problem”, 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 679 (1979). 
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issues, like mass torts;58 and threatening the autonomy of absent 
class members.59 
B.   Two Types of Defendant Aggregation 
 Though the historical roots of group litigation lie in aggregation of 
defendants—often an entire village with a shared obligation of har-
vest to a landlord or tithe to a church—aggregation of defendants has 
been described as a “rarity” in modern times.60 Yet, litigation against 
multiple defendants occurs every day in courts across the country: 
employers and employees, corporations and their subsidiaries, prin-
cipals and agents, co-conspirators, manufacturers and distributors, 
insured and insurers, etc.61 Two types of defendant aggregation must 
be distinguished.  
 When a plaintiff has a single claim to a single recovery for which 
more than one person is potentially liable, whether jointly (e.g., co-
obligors on a contract), severally (e.g., joint tortfeasors), or in the al-
ternative (e.g., a manufacturer and its component part supplier in a 
product defect case), aggregation of defendants is common and un-
controversial.62 Remedy-driven aggregation procedures often apply. 
Even if not, aggregation reflects the core purposes for which com-
monality-driven procedures were added to the federal rules: to pre-
vent division of a single recovery into multiple lawsuits.63 Like the 
historical roots of defendant aggregation, the defendants in these 
cases tend to have a pre-existing relationship, often direct (e.g., a 
manufacturer and its distributor) but at least indirect (e.g., two com-
ponent part suppliers for the same manufacturer). 
 On the other hand, when a plaintiff has similar but independent 
claims (each entitled to its own recovery) against multiple unrelated 
but similarly situated defendants, aggregation is far less common 
and more controversial. This Article focuses on these cases and uses 
the phrases defendant aggregation or aggregation of similarly situat-
ed defendants to refer to them. Notably, aggregation of unrelated 
plaintiffs with similar but independent claims is common and widely 
accepted.64 This is not to deny the serious debate, extensive commen-
tary, and numerous policy proposals surrounding aggregation of simi-
                                                                                                                  
 58. See Rosenberg, supra note 4, at 565-66 (summarizing criticism). 
 59. See REDISH, supra note 48, at 169-73. 
 60. YEAZELL, supra note 18, at 58, 135-36. 
 61. See, e.g., 7 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1657 (3d ed. 2001) (and notes therein).  
 62. See FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(2)(A); see also WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 
61, § 1654 (and notes therein). 
 63. See McFarland, supra note 55, at 260 n.66. 
 64. See Developments in the Law—Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1318, 1322 (1976). 
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larly situated plaintiffs, particularly via the class action. However, 
that debate is over the proper scope (e.g., are class actions appropri-
ate for mass tort claim?) or procedures (e.g., how to protect absent 
class members or avoid agency problems with plaintiffs’ lawyers). On 
the defendant side, the controversy is over the basic availability of 
aggregation for similarly situated defendants.  
C.   The Argument for Aggregating Similarly Situated Defendants 
 Prior scholarship on defendant aggregation has concluded, “the 
fundamental justification for consolidating plaintiff claims applies 
with equal force to defendants.”65 Specifically, aggregation of similarly 
situated plaintiffs is justified on three primary grounds that also seem 
to apply to similarly situated defendants: eliminating duplicative liti-
gation, making otherwise negative-value claims viable, and allowing 
plaintiffs to match defendants’ inherent ability to spread costs.  
 First, a benefit of all aggregative devices is the elimination or re-
duction of repetitive litigation over the same or similar issues, which 
wastes judicial and litigant resources66 and risks inconsistent judg-
ments that could undermine public faith in the administration of jus-
tice.67 Multi-defendant cases are as likely to raise the same or similar 
issues as multi-plaintiff cases; for example, multiple patent defend-
ants can each challenge the validity of the patent and rely on the 
same evidence and arguments.68 
 Second, plaintiff aggregation makes viable otherwise negative-
value claims, that is, “where the net expected recovery is [individual-
ly] small” and would not justify the cost of litigation, “but the total 
extent of societal loss is large.”69 Aggregation insures that the de-
fendant “pay[s] an amount equal to the losses caused by its wrong,” 
thereby “secur[ing] the practical implementation of the substantive 
law” and providing a deterrent that “reduces the willingness of the 
defendant to engage in the illegal conduct that caused the harm in 
                                                                                                                  
 65. Hamdani & Klement, supra note 4, at 689. 
 66. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 54, R. 42(a) (consolidation); Richard D. Freer, 
Avoiding Duplicative Litigation: Rethinking Plaintiff Autonomy and the Court’s Role in 
Defining the Litigative Unit, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 809, 813 (1989); Mary Kay Kane, Original 
Sin and the Transaction in Federal Civil Procedure, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1723, 1728-30 (1998) 
(permissive joinder); Susan M. Olson, Federal Multidistrict Litigation: Its Impact on Liti-
gants, 13 JUST. SYS. J. 341, 341 (1988-89) (multi-district litigation); Rosenberg, supra note 
4, at 563-64 (class actions). 
 67. See Freer, supra note 66, at 814; Edward F. Sherman, Aggregate Disposition of 
Related Cases: The Policy Issues, 10 REV. LITIG. 231, 236-43 (1991). 
 68. See Bryant, supra note 23, at 704-05. 
 69. Richard A. Epstein, Commentary, The Consolidation of Complex Litigation: A 
Critical Evaluation of the ALI Proposal, 10 J.L. & COM. 1, 6 (1990); see also Rosenberg, 
supra note 4, at 563-64, 570-72. 
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the first place.”70 Aggregation of defendants similarly allows the 
plaintiff to eliminate some costs that cannot be spread over multiple 
individual actions (e.g., filing fees, attending hearings and trial, and 
taking and defending depositions). This cost-reduction will make oth-
erwise negative-value claims viable, promoting optimal deterrence.  
 Moreover, the negative-value defense provides a “mirror-image” 
justification for aggregation of similarly situated defendants.71 Even 
defendants with meritorious defenses will settle if the cost of litiga-
tion exceeds the potential liability, and this threat of overpaying 
could over-deter legitimate conduct ex ante.72 For example, many say 
patent-assertion entities exploit their cheaper litigation costs to ob-
tain settlement payments less than the expected cost of defense, even 
for weak patents.73 Aggregation should allow defendants to reduce 
total costs by exploiting economies of scale, making more defenses 
positive-value, and moving closer to optimal deterrence.74 
 Third, even for individually positive-value claims, plaintiff aggre-
gation allows plaintiffs to share and spread costs over the whole set 
of their claims, which the defendant naturally will be able to do simp-
ly by being involved in many similar cases (e.g., by using the same 
expert witnesses, reusing briefing, undertaking a single document 
collection, etc.).75 Aggregation thus evens the ability and incentives of 
the parties to invest in litigation, making it more likely that the reso-
lution will reflect the merits rather than a “war of attrition” of costly 
discovery and motion practice.76 Cost-spreading also applies in re-
verse—that is, absent aggregation of defendants, plaintiffs have a 
greater ability to exploit economies of scale and therefore have great-
er settlement leverage or ability to engage in a war of attrition.77 For 
example, patent assertion entities have been accused of exploiting 
their lower cost of litigation and ability to spread costs among many 
defendants by making broad and costly discovery requests.78  
 Thus, in theory, defendant aggregation offers the same benefits as 
plaintiff aggregation, and these benefits generally accrue to the 
                                                                                                                  
 70. Epstein, supra note 69, at 6-7; see also, e.g., Rosenberg, supra note 4, at 563-64 
(discussing how aggregation can reduce the costs of individual litigation and promote  
optimal deterrence). 
 71. Hamdani & Klement, supra note 4, at 696-99. 
 72. Id. at 697.  
 73. See Ranganath Sudarshan, Nuisance-Value Patent Suits: An Economic Model and 
Proposal, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 159, 160 (2008); Taylor, supra 
note 7, at 674-75; Bryant, supra note 23, at 693.  
 74. Hamdani & Klement, supra note 4, at 698-99. 
 75. See Rosenberg, supra note 4, at 570-71. 
 76. See id. 
 77. Hamdani & Klement, supra note 4, at 696-99. 
 78. See Sudarshan, supra note 73, at 166-67; J. Jason Williams et al., Strategies for 
Combating Patent Trolls, 17 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 367, 368, 375 (2010).  
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courts and the party being aggregated (the defendant) at the expense 
of the non-aggregated party (the plaintiff).79 It also may serve an ad-
ditional socially beneficial function not shared by plaintiff aggrega-
tion, forcing defendants to produce information about relative contri-
butions to harm.80  
D.   Resistance to Aggregating Similarly Situated Defendants 
 Recent efforts by plaintiffs to aggregate unrelated but similarly 
situated defendants have sparked fierce resistance from defendants, 
courts, policymakers, and commentators in a variety of substantive 
areas. Although most of the controversy has centered on joinder of 
defendants under Rule 20, there also has been resistance to aggregat-
ing defendants via defendant class actions,81 consolidation under 
Rule 42(a),82 and the multi-district litigation statute.83  
1.   Patent Litigation 
 In recent years, patent litigation has become concentrated in dis-
tricts seen as particularly friendly to patent owners, also known as 
“patentees,” especially the Eastern District of Texas.84 Filing in a 
plaintiff-friendly district has been popular among what are variably 
called patent assertion entities, non-practicing entities, or pejorative-
ly, patent trolls,85 which derive revenue from threatening or filing 
patent litigation rather than commercializing the invention.86 Patent 
assertion entities are “perhaps the most controversial and least popu-
lar group of patent [holders]” accused of delaying litigation to maxim-
ize damages and leverage and using weak patents that are likely in-
valid but costly to invalidate.87 
                                                                                                                  
 79. See Hamdani & Klement, supra note 4, at 698-99 (describing benefit to defend-
ants); id. at 726-27 (noting that “[f]or plaintiffs, the downsides of the class defense are ob-
vious” and “[t]he upside of the class defense for plaintiffs is unclear”). 
 80. See Shen, supra note 22, at 98. 
 81. See Donald E. Burton, The Metes and Bounds of the Defendant Class Action in 
Patent Cases, 5 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 292 (2006) (describing disuse of de-
fendant class actions and objections raised to it). 
 82. See 35 U.S.C. § 299 (Supp. V 2011) (prohibiting consolidation of patent defendants 
for trial). 
 83. See Greg Ryan, JPML Head Judge Explains Why Panel Is More Picky, LAW360 
(May 24, 2013, 8:21 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/442674/jpml-head-judge-explains-
why-panel-is-more-picky (attributing increase in denial of multi-district litigation motions 
to increase in motions in patent cases, i.e., where defendants being aggregated). 
 84. Mark A. Lemley, Where to File Your Patent Case, 38 AIPLA Q.J. 401, 404 (2010). 
 85. PWC, 2012 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY 24 (showing that 37.4% of patent decisions 
in the Eastern District of Texas involved patent assertion entities compared to 20.6% in  
all districts). 
 86. Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and Evidence 
in the Litigation of High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571, 1578 (2009). 
 87. Id. at 1577-80. 
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 Patent assertion entities often filed a single lawsuit against mul-
tiple unrelated defendants accused of infringing the same patent(s) 
with independent but similar products. For example, a patent asser-
tion entity whose patent purportedly covered MMS messaging in mo-
bile phones might sue LG, Sanyo, Samsung, Research in Motion, and 
Apple—each of whom developed and sold MMS-capable phones but 
did so independently of, and in competition with, each other. Though 
not used exclusively by patent assertion entities, multi-defendant 
patent suits came to be associated with their questionable (or to be 
fair, questioned) litigation tactics and the plaintiff-friendly Eastern 
District of Texas. Patent assertion entities filed nineteen percent of 
patent cases but sued twenty-eight percent of defendants,88 and near-
ly twice as many defendants were sued per case in the Eastern Dis-
trict of Texas than the national average.89 Patent assertion entities 
were assumed to file multi-defendant suits to decrease their own 
costs, increase the costs of defendants, and decrease the chances of 
transfer by naming at least one defendant with a connection to the 
plaintiff-friendly district.90   
 The overwhelming majority of district courts, ultimately endorsed 
by the Federal Circuit, held that claims against “separate companies 
that independently design, manufacture and sell different products 
in competition with each other” did not arise from the same transac-
tion or occurrence for purposes of joinder, even where the products 
were accused of infringing the same patent and operated similarly.91 
Rather, “an actual link” between the products was required, such as 
a relationship between the defendants, the use of identically sourced 
components, or overlap in the products’ development or manufac-
ture.92 The minority view, adopted almost exclusively by the Eastern 
District of Texas,93 held that patent infringement claims arose from 
the same transaction or occurrence “if there is some nucleus of opera-
tive facts or law,” such as allegations that the defendants infringed 
the same patent or had products that were not “dramatically differ-
                                                                                                                  
 88. Id. at 1603-04 (2000–08 time period). 
 89. See James C. Pistorino, 2012 Trends in Patent Case Filings and Venue: Eastern 
District of Texas Most Popular for Plaintiffs (Again) but 11 Percent Fewer Defendants 
Named Nationwide, PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. DAILY, Feb. 11, 2013, at 3. This 
number is derived from the data reported for 2011, before Congress altered the joinder 
rules for patent cases.  
 90. Taylor, supra note 7, at 671-78. 
 91. Pergo, Inc. v. Alloc, Inc., 262 F. Supp. 2d 122, 128 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Androphy v. 
Smith & Nephew, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 620, 623 (N.D. Ill. 1998); see also In re EMC Corp., 
677 F.3d 1351, 1357 & n.2, 1359 & n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (adopting the overwhelming view 
outside the Eastern District of Texas that joinder is inappropriate for independent but 
similarly situated defendants). 
 92. In re EMC Corp., 677 F.3d at 1359-60. 
 93. Id. at 1357 & n.2. 
2014]  AGGREGATING DEFENDANTS 1025 
 
ent.”94 Citing judicial economy, these decisions reasoned that the 
most important issues, including the determination of patent scope, 
or “claim construction,” and invalidity, would be identical.95  
Congress resolved this split as part of a more general overhaul of 
the patent system in the 2011 America Invents Act (AIA).96 A new 
statutory provision, 35 U.S.C. § 299, provided that joinder, or consol-
idation for trial, of accused infringers only was permitted if the 
claims involved the making, using, importing, offering to sell, or sell-
ing “of the same accused product or process” and clarified that “alle-
gations that [the defendants] each have infringed the patent or pa-
tents in suit” alone were insufficient for joinder.97 Though the legisla-
tive history is sparse, the provision appears to have been motivated 
by concern about the Eastern District of Texas and perceived abusive 
litigation practices of patent assertion entities.98 As a result of the 
AIA’s anti-joinder provision, claims against unrelated defendants 
with independent products only can be aggregated for pre-trial pur-
poses and only through Rule 42(a) consolidation (if pending in  
the same district) or through multi-district litigation (if pending in 
different districts).99  
2.   Trademark and Copyright Litigation 
 Trademark holders have similarly sought to join several unrelated 
defendants for similar but independent activities alleged to violate 
the same rights. Defendants have objected, and courts have held that 
these independent activities are not part of the same transaction or 
occurrence for purposes of joinder.100  
 Efforts to aggregate similarly situated copyright defendants have 
been even more controversial. The internet allows diffuse individuals 
to share copyrighted movies, videos, or music through so-called “peer-
to-peer” (P2P) networks, the earliest and most famous of which was 
                                                                                                                  
 94. MyMail, Ltd. v. Am. Online, Inc., 223 F.R.D. 455, 456-57 (E.D. Tex. 2004). 
 95. See Innovative Global Sys. LLC v. Tpk. Global Techs. LLC, No. 6:09-CV-157, 2009 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105929, at *5-7 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 20, 2009); Adrain v. Genetec Inc., No. 
2:08-CV-423, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86855, at *7-10 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2009); Sprint 
Commc’ns Co. v. Theglobe.com, Inc., 233 F.R.D. 615, 617 (D. Kan. 2006); MyMail, 223 
F.R.D. at 456-58. 
 96. See generally Taylor, supra note 7 (discussing background and consequences of 
AIA reforms to patent joinder). 
 97. 35 U.S.C. § 299 (Supp. V 2011). 
 98. See Taylor, supra note 7, at 700-06. 
 99. See id. at 719-22. 
 100. See Bravado Int’l Grp. Merch. Servs. v. Cha, No. CV 09-9066 PSG, 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 80361, at *11-14 (C.D. Cal. June 30, 2010); Golden Scorpio Corp. v. Steel Horse Bar 
& Grill, 596 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1285 (D. Ariz. 2009); Colt Def. LLC v. Heckler & Koch Def., 
Inc., No. 2:04CV258, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28690, at *15-16 (E.D. Va. Oct. 22, 2004); SB 
Designs v. Reebok Int’l, Ltd., 305 F. Supp. 2d 888, 892 (N.D. Ill. 2004). 
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Napster.101 After early efforts to hold P2P networks liable ultimately 
failed,102 the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) and 
its major record label members began suing individual file-sharers, 
primarily as a deterrent.103 The RIAA’s basic strategy was to search 
P2P networks for particular copyrighted materials; collect the IP ad-
dresses of uploaders of infringing files; sue numerous “John Does” in 
a single lawsuit, with each John Doe representing a different upload-
er’s IP address; seek court approval for early subpoenas to internet 
service providers (ISPs) to determine the identities of the John Does; 
and contact the John Does and offer to settle the case for around 
$3000, which was less than the cost of defense.104 Overall, the RIAA 
and its members sued 30,000 individuals during its 2003 to 2008 en-
forcement campaign, sometimes in individual lawsuits and some-
times in groups of dozens or hundreds of individuals, most of whom 
were John Does.105 
 Of the many potential problems with the RIAA’s strategy,106 courts 
and defendants focused primarily on the propriety of joinder.107 Plain-
tiffs alleged that joinder was proper because each defendant “com-
mitted violations of the same law (e.g., copyright law), by committing 
the same acts (e.g., the downloading and distribution of copyrighted 
sound recordings owned by Plaintiffs), and by using the same means 
                                                                                                                  
 101. Bridy, supra note 23, at 698-710; Hamdani & Klement, supra note 4, at 699-700. 
 102. See Hamdani & Klement, supra note 4, at 700. 
 103. See id. at 700-01. 
 104. Karunaratne, supra note 14, at 286-87. 
 105. Bridy, supra note 23, at 721. Commentators frequently suggest that the RIAA 
“usually nam[ed] dozens or hundreds of defendants per suit.” David Kravets, Copyright 
Lawsuits Plummet in Aftermath of RIAA Campaign, WIRED (May 18, 2010, 1:24 PM), 
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/05/riaa-bump/. But the RIAA sued the 30,000 indi-
viduals in approximately 13,000 lawsuits, an average of only 2.3 defendants per lawsuit. 
Bridy, supra note 23, at 721 (noting increase in copyright lawsuits from 2003–2008 and 
attributing it to RIAA campaign). The RIAA lawsuits were a mix of suits against a single 
individual file-sharer and suits against dozens or hundreds of file-sharers, most of whom 
were John Does. See Ray Beckerman, P.C., Index of Litigation Documents Referred to in 
“Recording Industry vs. The People”, BECKERMANLEGAL, http://beckermanlegal.com/ 
Documents.htm (last updated May 17, 2013) (listing exemplary music industry cases). The 
RIAA generally used aggregated actions when it did not know the identity of the defend-
ants and individual actions when it did. See Arista Records, LLC v. Does 1–11, No. 1:07–
CV–2828, 2008 WL 4823160, at *3 & n.3, *6 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 3, 2008) (stating that the 
RIAA will likely re-file individual actions once the defendants are identified). Individual 
suits may have been used to deprive defendants of economies of scale, see Hamdani & 
Klement, supra note 4, at 699-702, or it may be that most defendants chose to settle and 
those that did not were not subject to personal jurisdiction and venue in the same district. 
See Karunaratne, supra note 14, at 287, 298-302. 
 106. See generally Karunaratne, supra note 14 (noting concerns about abuse of John 
Doe procedures, insufficient showings for expedited subpoenas, lack of personal jurisdic-
tion, and lack of a necessary connection between IP address and file-sharer). 
 107. See id. at 287-88 (noting that courts in RIAA cases responded “with particular 
force on the joinder issue” and that courts “were less willing to confront questions of  
personal jurisdiction”). 
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(e.g., a file-sharing network) that each Defendant accessed via the 
same ISP.”108 The propriety of joinder often was contested by a de-
fendant109 or the court sua sponte,110 and “the majority of district 
courts who . . . addressed the issue of joinder . . . concluded that those 
allegations were insufficient to satisfy the transactional requirement 
of Fed.R.Civ.P. 20(a)(2) and that joinder was therefore improper.”111 
Courts held that “merely alleging that the Doe Defendants all used 
the same ISP and file-sharing network to conduct copyright in-
fringement without asserting that they acted in concert was not 
enough to satisfy the same series of transactions requirement under 
the Federal Rules,” and that merely alleging that the defendants 
caused “the same type of harm” rather than “the same harm” was in-
sufficient for joinder.112 Some courts even proposed sanctions against 
the plaintiffs for attempting joinder.113 
 With the end of the RIAA’s campaign, mass copyright enforcement 
shifted to the movie industry and to the pornographic films industry 
in particular. The litigation model essentially was the same as that of 
the RIAA, though joinder often was now of hundreds or thousands of 
John Does.114 As with the RIAA litigation, defendants115 or courts sua 
sponte116 challenged the mass joinder of defendants, and many courts 
held that “the fact that a large number of people use the same meth-
od to violate the law does not authorize them to be joined as defend-
ants in a single lawsuit” because each defendant independently ac-
cessed the P2P network and downloaded the copyrighted file pieces 
in “discrete and separate acts that took place at different times” 
without concerted action.117 
                                                                                                                  
 108. Does 1–11, 2008 WL 4823160, at *1 (quoting complaint); Arista Records, LLC v. 
Does 1–27, No. 07-162-B-W, 2008 WL 222283, at *1 (D. Me. Jan. 25, 2008) (quoting com-
plaint), report and recommendation adopted, 584 F. Supp. 2d 240 (D. Me. 2008). 
 109. Does 1–11, 2008 WL 4823160, at *1. 
 110. See Does 1–27, 2008 WL 222283, at *6 n.5. 
 111. Does 1–11, 2008 WL 4823160, at *6; see also Bridy, supra note 23, at 722, 723 & 
nn.164-69 (explaining the reasoning of courts’ sua sponte finding of improper joinder in 
multiple jurisdictions); Karunaratne, supra note 14, at 287-88 & nn.25-28 (noting that 
courts find joinder to be improper in file-sharing cases when defendants only use the same 
ISP and peer-to-peer networks). The limited courts not ordering de-aggregation generally 
concluded only that severance was premature until the Does were identified. See Does 1–
11, 2008 WL 4823160, at *3-5. 
 112. Does 1–11, 2008 WL 4823160, at *6. 
 113. See Does 1–27, 2008 WL 222283, at *6 n.5. 
 114. See Bridy, supra note 23, at 721-22. See generally Karunaratne, supra note 14 
(discussing the propriety of joinder in copyright infringement cases against John Does).  
 115. See Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1–188, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1153 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
 116. See Next Phase Distrib., Inc. v. Does 1–27, 284 F.R.D. 165, 166 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 117. Digital Sins, Inc. v. Does 1–245, No. 11 Civ. 8170(CM), 2012 WL 1744838, at *2 
(S.D.N.Y. May 15, 2012). 
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 Courts in the pornography cases are more divided on joinder than 
in the RIAA cases, but the division is over whether the defendants 
acted in concert, not whether similar claims against unrelated de-
fendants can be aggregated.118 In earlier P2P networks, a single user 
uploaded a copyrighted file, which was then downloaded in its entire-
ty separately by other users. BitTorrent breaks the copyrighted ma-
terial into pieces, which a user then collects from various other users 
and must share with others once in her possession.119 Some courts 
have upheld joinder (or postponed resolution), concluding that con-
certed action existed to the extent the defendants were part of the 
same group of users (called a “swarm”) sharing the same pieces at 
the same time or in the same time period.120  
3.   Telecommunications Cases 
 Controversy over aggregation of similarly situated defendants has 
frequently arisen in telecommunications cases,121 most notably in Di-
recTV’s campaign against piracy. DirecTV raided businesses selling 
devices that could unscramble its signals and sent demand letters to 
more than 170,000 purchasers, offering to settle for $3500 per pur-
chaser (presumably less than the cost of defense).122 DirecTV ulti-
mately sued over 24,000 individuals under various wiretap, commu-
nications, and copyright laws, often by suing several unrelated and 
independent violators in a single suit.123 
 Once again, many potential problems existed with these cases,124 
but the joinder issue, raised either by defendants’ motions or sua 
sponte by the court,125 was the focal point of resistance.126 “Most 
courts presented with a suit of this type have concluded that the 
claims against the various defendants are not transactionally relat-
                                                                                                                  
 118. See Next Phase, 284 F.R.D. at 168-69. 
 119. Karunaratne, supra note 14, at 288-90. 
 120. Digital Sin, Inc. v. Does 1–27, No. 12 Civ. 3873(JMF), 2012 WL 2036035, at *2 
(S.D.N.Y. June 6, 2012). 
 121. See, e.g., Don King Prods., Inc. v. Colon-Rosario, 561 F. Supp. 2d 189 (D.P.R. 
2008); Movie Sys., Inc. v. Abel, 99 F.R.D. 129, 129-30 (D. Minn. 1983) (18 suits against 
1,795 total individuals). 
 122. In re DIRECTV, Inc., No. C-02-5912-JW, 2004 WL 2645971, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 
26, 2004); Hamdani & Klement, supra note 4, at 703-06. 
 123. See David W. Opderbeck, Peer-to-Peer Networks, Technological Evolution, and 
Intellectual Property Reverse Private Attorney General Litigation, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1685, 1725-26 (2005). For example, DirecTV sued 775 defendants in 180 lawsuits in the 
Northern District of California. See DIRECTV, 2004 WL 2645971, at *2. 
 124. See Hamdani & Klement, supra note 4, at 703-06 (noting concerns about viability 
of statutory claims, investigative techniques, and lack of necessary correlation between 
device and piracy).  
 125. See, e.g., DIRECTV, 2004 WL 2645971, at *1 (sua sponte); DirecTV, Inc. v. Bee-
cher, 296 F. Supp. 2d 937, 939 (S.D. Ind. 2003) (motion). 
 126. See DIRECTV, 2004 WL 2645971, at *5 (summarizing cases).  
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ed” for joinder.127 They have held that “[i]ndividual purchasers, who 
have no business connection with one another and who make their 
purchases independently of one another are not engaged in the same 
transaction,” even though they received their devices from the same 
shipping facility, “perform[ed] the same act in the same [geographic] 
area,” and engaged in “similar statutory violations” that “injured 
DIRECTV in the same manner.”128 
4.   Other Examples  
 Technology cases are not the only examples of efforts by plaintiffs 
to aggregate similarly situated defendants and corresponding re-
sistance by defendants, courts, and policymakers. This has also oc-
curred in products liability,129 environmental,130 consumer protec-
tion,131 indemnification,132 and other types of cases.133 
E.   The Puzzle of Defendant Aggregation 
 The narrative of plaintiff aggregation has become well defined in 
its nearly half-century at the forefront of American litigation. Plain-
tiffs (and their attorneys) seek aggregation because they benefit from 
its economies of scale, while defendants generally oppose plaintiff 
aggregation because of the in terrorem effect of the aggregated liabil-
ity.134 Courts and policymakers walk a middle ground, allowing ag-
                                                                                                                  
 127. MOORE ET AL., supra note 49, § 20.05[3], at 20-37; see also DIRECTV, 2004 WL 
2645971, at *5 (summarizing cases and rationales); McFarland, supra note 55, at 268 (not-
ing that out of the several courts that have considered joinder in television-pirating cases, 
one has allowed joinder while a dozen others have denied it). 
 128. DIRECTV, 2004 WL 2645971, at *4. 
 129. Erichson, supra note 20, at 403 & n.80. Many multi-defendant products liability 
cases, and multi-defendant cases in other contexts, involve aggregated plaintiffs each  
injured in similar ways but only by one defendant. Defendants have contested the proprie-
ty of defendant aggregation in these cases, see, e.g., Turpeau v. Fidelity Fin. Servs., 936 F. 
Supp. 975, 980 (N.D. Ga. 1996), but more often, defendants contest whether plaintiffs meet 
the requirements for a class action, see, e.g., Arch v. Am. Tobacco Co., 175 F.R.D. 469,  
489 (E.D. Pa. 1997), or joinder, see, e.g., Abdullah v. Acands, Inc., 30 F.3d 264, 268 & n.5 
(1st Cir. 1994). 
 130. See, e.g., Coal. for a Sustainable Delta v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., No. 1:09–CV–
480 OWW GSA, 2009 WL 3857417 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2009). 
 131. See, e.g., Turpeau, 936 F. Supp. at 979-80. 
 132. See, e.g., United States v. Katz, 494 F. Supp. 2d 645, 646 (S.D. Ohio 2006). 
 133. See, e.g., Nassau Cnty. Ass’n of Ins. Agents v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 497 F.2d 
1151, 1152 (2d Cir. 1974) (employment and antitrust case). 
 134. See Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregation and Its Discontents: Class Settlement Pres-
sure, Class-Wide Arbitration, and CAFA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1872, 1873-74 (2006) [herein-
after Nagareda, Discontents]. This description is admittedly a generalization. See Elizabeth 
Chamblee Burch, Litigating Groups, 61 ALA. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (2009) (discussing a defend-
ant’s preference for aggregated settlements of mass joinder actions); Richard A. Nagareda, 
Autonomy, Peace, and Put Options in the Mass Tort Class Action, 115 HARV. L. REV. 747, 
751 (2002) (discussing defendants’ support for settlement classes) [hereinafter Nagareda, 
Autonomy]; David Rosenberg, Adding a Second Opt-Out to Rule 23(b)(3) Class Actions: Cost 
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gregation of similarly situated plaintiffs but imposing limits in some 
cases and some contexts. By contrast, the narrative of defendant ag-
gregation is utterly confused. Theoretically, defendants obtain simi-
lar economies of scale and the judicial system obtains similar effi-
ciencies from aggregation. Defendants face no in terrorem effect, as 
an individual defendant’s liability does not change with aggregation. 
To the contrary, defendant aggregation increases resources on the 
defense side and raises the stakes for the plaintiff, since a single loss 
extinguishes all of its claims.   
 Yet, plaintiffs have generally sought to aggregate defendants 
while defendants, courts, and policymakers have resisted, assuming 
that defendant aggregation benefits plaintiffs at the expense of de-
fendants.135 Parts III and IV seek to solve this puzzle of defendant 
aggregation, with the former focusing on defendant resistance and 
the latter systemic resistance. 
III.   DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT AGGREGATION  
 This Part explores why defendants oppose being aggregated de-
spite the economies of scale benefits they should obtain. In some con-
texts, the explanation is easy because aggregation is clearly against 
defendants’ interests. In other contexts, the effects of aggregation on 
defendants are unclear. And, in at least one category of cases, de-
fendants lose nothing from being aggregated and their resistance  
appears irrational. 
A.   Creating Additional Litigation for Defendants 
 Defendants’ opposition to being aggregated is easy to explain in 
cases, like the BitTorrent copyright litigation, where the stakes are 
small, each defendant’s liability is less than the cost of individual lit-
igation, and the claims are only economically viable because of the 
cost-savings the plaintiff realizes from defendant aggregation. De-
fendants are better off without being aggregated because these 
claims would never be brought individually and defendants would 
have no need for the economies of scale aggregation offers them. 
 This category of cases may not be particularly large. Even without 
aggregation, a plaintiff can spread many of its costs over the full 
portfolio of individual cases through, for example, form complaints; 
reuse of briefs, expert reports, and discovery requests; and a single 
fact investigation and document collection.136 In only a limited set of 
                                                                                                                  
Without Benefit, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 19, 22-23 (2003) (discussing hold-out and opt-out 
plaintiffs in mass joinders and class actions).  
 135. See, e.g., Bridy, supra note 23, at 722-24; Taylor, supra note 7, at 671-78. 
 136. See Hamdani & Klement, supra note 4, at 696 n.36.  
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cases will the additional savings the plaintiff realizes from defendant 
aggregation—filing fees, administrative costs related to preparing 
and submitting court documents, and attendance at depositions, 
hearings, and trial137—be the difference in the viability of the claim. 
In the BitTorrent cases, the plaintiff had unusually high up-front 
costs because it only knew the infringers’ IP addresses and needed 
expedited subpoenas to obtain the identities of those whom it could 
target for settlement demands.138 The cost of separate filing fees, 
moving individually for expedited subpoenas, attending separate 
subpoena hearings, and executing individual subpoenas on the ISPs 
would likely dwarf the few thousand dollars at stake.139 A small sub-
set of extreme patent troll cases also may fit in this category, where 
the patentee sues large numbers of end-users of common technology 
(e.g., hotels using Wi-Fi related patents or small businesses using 
scanners) and demands only a few thousand dollars from each.140 The 
patent anti-joinder provision seems to have deterred these small-
stakes patent cases.141  
 On the other hand, higher stakes cases where defendant aggrega-
tion is not the difference in the viability of the plaintiffs’ claims will 
be brought even if defendants cannot be aggregated. This is true of 
most patent cases; there was only a small decrease in the total  
number of defendants sued and no significant effect on patent asser-
tion entities’ share of defendants after enactment of the patent  
anti-joinder provision.142 Similarly, the financial stakes in the indi-
vidual RIAA and DirecTV cases were small, but the corporate plain-
tiffs derived significantly greater value from the larger deterrent  
effect of the suits.143 While it is possible they would have sued fewer 
defendants without aggregation, depending on how many suits were 
necessary to provide sufficient deterrence, both the RIAA and  
DirecTV plaintiffs often pursued individual, negative-value lawsuits 
when necessary.144   
                                                                                                                  
 137. See Bridy, supra note 23, at 722; Taylor, supra note 7, at 672. 
 138. See Karunaratne, supra note 14, at 291. 
 139. See Karunaratne, supra note 14, at 303-04. 
 140. See, e.g., Joe Mullin, Wi-Fi Patent Troll Hit with Racketeering Suit Emerges Un-
scathed, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 13, 2013, 10:05 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/ 
2013/02/wi-fi-patent-troll-hit-with-novel-anti-racketeering-charges-emerges-unscathed/.  
 141. See Colleen Chien, Patent Trolls by the Numbers 3 (Mar. 13, 2013) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2233041.  
 142. Id.; Pistorino, supra note 89, at 4. 
 143. See supra Part III.D.2-3. 
 144. See Arista Records, LLC v. Does 1–11, No. 1:07–CV–2828, 2008 WL 4823160, at *5 
(N.D. Ohio Nov. 3, 2008) (“Plaintiffs indicated to the Magistrate Judge that they intend to 
sever the Doe Defendants’ cases once they have been identified.”). 
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B.   Cost-Differentials 
 Even for claims with high enough stakes to be brought individual-
ly, defendant aggregation could create, or accentuate, a pro-plaintiff 
cost-differential, incentivizing plaintiffs to bring weak claims and de-
fendants to settle meritorious defenses, at least at the margins.145 
Despite the suggestions that this has occurred in multi-defendant 
patent “troll” cases,146 it is unclear why the net costs of defendant ag-
gregation would favor plaintiffs.147  
 Although empirical evidence is lacking, it is doubtful that aggre-
gating defendants would eliminate more costs from individual litiga-
tion for plaintiffs than defendants. Plaintiffs can spread many of 
their costs over individual cases, and any efforts by defendants in 
individual suits to spread costs through a joint defense group or other 
informal aggregation are likely to be less effective, efficient, and  
substantial.148 With the exception of the $400 filing fee, an insubstan-
tial amount for any individually viable claim, defendants can match 
or exceed whatever additional cost-savings plaintiffs realize from  
defendant aggregation by, for example, dividing responsibility for 
depositions, hearings, and trial; splitting up document review and 
fact investigation; and preparing joint briefing or expert reports on 
common issues.149  
 On the other hand, defendant aggregation may impose new costs 
on defendants not present in individual litigation and not matched by 
the individual plaintiff. Aggregated parties often are required, either 
by court order or strategic considerations, to agree on a common 
strategy, achieve consensus on the myriad of issues that arise in liti-
gation, divide tasks, file a single brief on common issues, or even pre-
sent a single argument at a hearing or single case at trial,150 all of 
which could impose substantial coordination costs in attorney time 
and client money.151 Aggregated plaintiffs minimize these coordina-
tion costs because plaintiffs’ lawyers’ contingency fee arrangements 
provide an incentive to reduce costs by dividing, rather than duplicat-
                                                                                                                  
 145. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing 
Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 891 (1987). 
 146. See Taylor, supra note 7, at 673-75. 
 147. See Coffee, supra note 145, at 891-94 (describing difficulty in identifying existence 
and extent of cost-differential in litigation). 
 148. See Taylor, supra note 7, at 673-75.  
 149. See Erichson, supra note 20, at 403-05. 
 150. Taylor, supra note 7, at 673 & n.103, 674. 
 151. See Mark Baghdassarian & Aaron Frankel, Litigation: Managing Joint Defense 
Groups in Asymmetrical Lawsuits, INSIDECOUNSEL (Aug. 23, 2012), http://www.inside coun-
sel.com/2012/08/23/litigation-managing-joint-defense-groups-in-asymme?t=litigation&page=2; 
see also Judith Resnik et al., Individuals Within the Aggregate: Relationships, Representa-
tion, and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 296, 304 (1996) (noting increase in plaintiff aggregation of 
“multiple sets of lawyers within a single aggregated litigation”). 
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ing, work and compromising, rather than disputing, strategy or re-
sponsibilities.152 But for aggregated defendants, defense attorneys’ 
hourly fee arrangements are likely to increase coordination costs, as 
duplicating work (e.g., attending every deposition or carefully editing 
every joint submission) and disputing strategy and responsibilities 
maximizes fees.153 Yet, if the resulting high coordination costs elimi-
nated the cost-savings defendants otherwise realize from being ag-
gregated, a rational defendant would respond by insisting on fee ar-
rangements that minimized coordination costs, not by rejecting ag-
gregation. Before Congress passed the patent anti-joinder provision, 
companies sued in multi-defendant patent cases in the Eastern Dis-
trict of Texas had begun to share a common attorney with other de-
fendants, insist on a fixed fee, or refuse to pay for duplicative work.154 
 Aggregated defendants also face potential free-rider problems, 
that is, some defendants do the minimal work necessary for their in-
dividual cases and rely on other defendants to develop common de-
fenses that apply to all defendants regardless of who pays for them.155 
However, common defenses are public goods and a defendant that 
prevails on a common defense in individual litigation will bear the 
full cost but realize only some of the benefits, which are shared with 
any other similarly situated defendant.156 Thus, aggregation poses no 
greater free-rider costs than individual litigation.157 
C.   Substantive Effects 
 Defendant aggregation does not just affect the costs of litigation; it 
also affects its substance. Perhaps defendants oppose being aggregated 
despite its potential economies of scale, because of substantive concerns. 
1.   Asymmetric Preclusion 
 The doctrine of non-mutual issue preclusion precludes a party 
from re-litigating an issue it lost in a prior suit but does not bind a 
non-party to the prior suit.158 As a result, if a plaintiff loses on a key 
issue in an individual case then it will be bound by that loss in all 
other cases against similarly situated defendants, but if it prevails, it 
                                                                                                                  
 152. See Coffee, supra note 145, at 889-94; see also Resnik et al., supra note 151, at 
309-14 (describing workings of aggregated plaintiffs’ lawyers). 
 153. See Coffee, supra note 145, at 892. 
 154. See Baghdassarian & Frankel, supra note 151 (suggesting shared counsel). 
 155. See id. 
 156. See Roger Allan Ford, Patent Invalidity Versus Noninfringement, 99 CORNELL L. 
REV. 71, 109-12 (2013).  
 157. See Defendant Class Actions, supra note 20, at 648. The public good nature of 
common defenses is normally an argument for, not against, aggregation of similarly situat-
ed defendants. See Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 23, at 1534-35. 
 158. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971). 
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still has to re-litigate the issue with each subsequent defendant, with 
the risk that a subsequent loss will be binding in all remaining cases. 
Aggregation deprives defendants of the multiple bites at the apple 
offered in serial litigation by non-mutual preclusion.  
 However, this is only a loss to defendants if their defenses are in-
dividually positive-value, that is, the potential liability exceeds the 
cost of individual litigation. If the cost of individual litigation exceed-
ed the potential liability, defendants would settle, and there would be 
no final judgment to which asymmetric preclusion could apply.159 For 
example, some patent troll cases, the RIAA file-sharing litigation, 
and the DirecTV suits likely involved negative-value defenses where 
asymmetric preclusion would be largely irrelevant.160 
 Even in higher stakes cases with individually positive-value de-
fenses, asymmetric preclusion only is significant in limited circum-
stances. If the primary issues are legal, subsequent defendants often 
will be effectively bound by resolution of an issue in earlier litigation 
through stare decisis, persuasive power, or simply disinclination to 
revisit something already decided.161 A rational defendant probably 
would prefer aggregation and the opportunity to influence the initial 
decision than the gamble that it can convince a subsequent court to 
revisit the issue after it was botched by the first defendant,162 espe-
cially since plaintiffs in serial litigation target weak, underfunded 
defendants first to cheaply and quickly obtain favorable precedent.163 
Asymmetric preclusion also is of little help in cases where the prima-
ry issues relate to fact questions unique to each defendant—say the 
purpose to which the defendant put the DirecTV unscrambling de-
vice—since favorable findings for earlier defendants would be inap-
plicable to subsequent defendants. 
Thus, asymmetric preclusion only is advantageous to defendants 
in cases where the primary issues are factual but common, such as 
questions related to the plaintiff’s conduct. Patent litigation is one 
such example: two key patent defenses—invalidity and misconduct in 
the Patent Office (i.e., “inequitable conduct”)—have significant factu-
al components common to each defendant.164 It is possible that patent 
                                                                                                                  
 159. See Hamdani & Klement, supra note 4, at 737. 
 160. See id. at 701-04 (describing negative-value nature of defenses in RIAA and Di-
recTV cases); Jeremy P. Oczek, Rethinking Defense in “Patent Troll” Cases, CORP. COUNS., 
Mar. 27, 2013, available at http://www.bsk.com/media-center/2730-rethinking-defense-
patent-troll-cases (noting that the average cost to defend patent cases is $1 million when 
less than $1 million is at stake and $3 million when $1 to 25 million is at stake). 
 161. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 391 (1996) (noting that 
stare decisis would apply to patent claim interpretation even without issue preclusion). 
 162. See Jeffrey T. Haley, Strategies and Antitrust Limitations for Multiple Potential 
Patent Infringers, 21 AIPLA Q.J. 327, 334-35 (1993). 
 163. See Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 23, at 1488. 
 164. See id. at 1501-03. 
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defendants realize more benefits from asymmetric preclusion than 
they do from aggregation’s economies of scale, though, even here, 
commentators have suggested that the rejection of an invalidity de-
fense in an earlier case makes a later finding of invalidity less likely.165    
2.   Jury and Judicial Confusion 
 Pursuing separate claims simultaneously against multiple de-
fendants may allow the plaintiff to exploit judicial or jury confusion 
over which evidence and arguments apply to which defendants.166 
Confusion is not inherently detrimental to aggregated defendants. 
For example, a similar risk of confusion of evidence and arguments is 
seen as benefitting aggregated plaintiffs by allowing them to focus on 
the strongest claims or combine strong parts of various claims to cre-
ate a collective claim stronger than any individual one.167  
 However, plaintiffs may strategically use their control over aggre-
gation to combine weaker claims with stronger claims, hoping the 
evidence and arguments for the latter will bolster the former. For 
example, a DirecTV defendant that used the unscrambling device for 
some legitimate purpose will have a difficult time highlighting this 
when aggregated with lots of defendants who used the device to steal 
DirecTV’s signals. Similarly, aggregating claims that a few defend-
ants willfully and knowingly infringed a patent may bolster claims of 
ordinary (strict liability) infringement against other defendants.  
 When applicable, the risk of judicial or jury confusion is a strong 
reason for defendants to resist being aggregated. On the other hand, 
potential confusion from aggregation does not make defendants 
whose individual defenses are negative-value worse off, since they 
would default or settle individual litigation without the opportunity 
to benefit from an unconfused decision-maker. Even for positive-
value defenses, confusion only poses a problem if there is significant 
heterogeneity among the defendants.168 If the primary defenses are 
common (e.g., patent invalidity when the claims are broad and clear-
ly cover the accused products) or very similar (e.g., patent non-
infringement when the patentee alleges the patent covers all prod-
                                                                                                                  
 165. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., FTC v. Actavis: The Patent-Antitrust Intersection Revisited 
44 (Tulane Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 13-19, 
2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2348075. 
 166. See, e.g., Bridy, supra note 23, at 722-23. 
 167. See Erbsen, supra note 28, at 1009-14. 
 168. See id. at 1014; see also, e.g., Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp. v. Contec Corp., 220 
F.R.D. 415, 418 (D. Del. 2004) (citing potential prejudice in ordering de-aggregation be-
cause co-defendant was not presenting defense to infringement at trial). 
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ucts with certain functionality regardless of how implemented),169 
there is little risk of prejudice to defendants from jury or judicial con-
fusion. For example, potential confusion does not explain resistance 
to aggregation in many patent troll cases, which often involve broad-
ly asserted claims and, consequently, defenses of either invalidity or 
non-infringement that apply equally to all defendants. 
3.   Autonomy 
 Autonomy includes “the power of individuals to make fundamen-
tal choices concerning their legal rights of action – for example, the 
power to choose when and how to sue, whether to settle, and if so, 
under what terms.”170 Plaintiff aggregation increasingly faces  
autonomy concerns,171 and these concerns may also underlie re-
sistance to defendant aggregation.172 However, aggregation can only 
raise autonomy concerns for positive-value defenses; for negative-
value defenses, aggregation promotes defendants’ autonomy by allow-
ing them to defend rather than default and by deterring plaintiffs 
from bringing strike suits.173 Individual autonomy also is of question-
able relevance to corporate defendants, who lack the strong autono-
my interests of individuals.174  
 Moreover, in practice, defendant aggregation almost never is at-
tempted through representative procedures, like the class action, 
that pose the greatest threat to individual autonomy.175 Rather, de-
fendant aggregation has generally occurred via procedures (e.g., 
permissive joinder, consolidation, or multi-district litigation) that 
leave the substantive rights of the defendants separate and allow 
each defendant to retain control over its own case, obtain a separate 
judgment as to its liability, choose its own attorney, settle whenever 
and on whatever terms it chooses, and present its individual de-
                                                                                                                  
 169. See Mark A. Lemley, Software Patents and the Return of Functional Claiming, 
2013 WIS. L. REV. 905, 907-08 (describing common problem of broad functional claims that 
“purport to cover any possible way of achieving a goal”).  
 170. Nagareda, Autonomy, supra note 134, at 750; see also Epstein, supra note 69, at 5 
(stating that autonomy over one’s lawsuit is a critical element of fairness). 
 171. Sergio J. Campos, Mass Torts and Due Process, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1059, 1060-61 (2012). 
 172. See, e.g., Wiav Networks, LLC v. 3COM Corp., No. C 10-03448 WHA, 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 110957, at *16 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2010) (“[T]he accused defendants — who will 
surely have competing interests and strategies — are also entitled to present individual-
ized assaults on questions of non-infringement, invalidity, and claim construction.”). 
 173. Cf. Epstein, supra note 69, at 6 (concluding that plaintiff aggregation raises no 
autonomy concerns when the plaintiffs’ claims are too small to pursue individually because 
individual control is too expensive for anyone to rationally choose it). 
 174. See Nathan Oman, Corporations and Autonomy Theories of Contract: A Critique of 
the New Lex Mercatoria, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 101, 114 (2005). 
 175. REDISH, supra note 48, at 230. 
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fense.176 Thus, aggregated defendants are not “forced to adjudicate 
their [defenses] passively” but rather are “able to represent [their] 
own interests fully as a litigant before the court.”177 
 Thus, the only autonomy interest inherently threatened by de-
fendant aggregation is the ability to present one’s defense without 
the judge or jury hearing any other defense or to pursue one’s pre-
ferred strategy without any compromise or potential dilution from 
the judge or jury being presented with competing strategies from co-
defendants. A defendant would have to value autonomy unusually 
highly to conclude that this limited threat outweighed the benefits 
from aggregation’s economies of scale. Admittedly, judicial practices 
aimed at maximizing efficiency or minimizing workloads do accentu-
ate autonomy concerns, as judges sometimes mandate that all aggre-
gated defendants file a single brief, speak with a single voice, or 
share the same amount of trial time as allotted to a single plaintiff.178 
If these practices were defendants’ real concerns, the proper recourse 
would be to challenge judicial case management procedures or judi-
cial discretion, not to seek full-scale de-aggregation. 
4.   Tool to Achieve Other Substantive Objectives 
 Another possibility is that defendants oppose being aggregated not 
because they dislike defendant aggregation as such but because seek-
ing de-aggregation is doctrinally possible and serves other strategic 
objectives, such as creating delay and cost for the plaintiff from mo-
tion practice and re-filing179 or eliminating a co-defendant with ties to 
a plaintiff-friendly jurisdiction that serves as an anchor preventing 
transfer.180 Or perhaps defendants take the doctrinal opportunity for 
de-aggregation simply as a reflex from always opposing plaintiff ag-
gregation or because they fear that greater use of aggregative proce-
dures will have spillover effects that will promote plaintiff aggrega-
tion. Of course, the benefits from these other strategic objectives 
                                                                                                                  
 176. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(3); Malcolm v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 995 F.2d 346, 352 
(2d Cir. 1993); Dupont v. S. Pac. Co., 366 F.2d 193, 195-96 (5th Cir. 1966); MacAlister v. 
Guterma, 263 F.2d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 1958); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION 
(FOURTH) §§ 10.222, 12.21–.22, 13.21 (2004); MOORE ET AL., supra note 49, § 20.02[4].  
 177. REDISH, supra note 48, at 230. 
 178. See, e.g., Trial Scheduling Order, Fractus S.A. v. Samsung Elecs. Corp., No. 6:09–
CV–203 (E.D. Tex. May 6, 2011) (allotting thirty minutes per side for jury selection, forty 
minutes per side for opening arguments, fifteen hours per side for direct/cross examination, 
and one hour per side for closing arguments in patent case involving single plaintiff and 
multiple unrelated defendants). 
 179. See Rosenberg, supra note 4, at 571. 
 180. See Taylor, supra note 7, at 676-79. De-aggregation has done little to help patent 
defendants get out of the Eastern District of Texas, as courts have relied on the pending 
litigation in the same district against the previously aggregated defendant as a basis for 
denying transfer. See In re EMC Corp., 501 F. App'x 973, 976 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
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would have to be greater than the benefits defendants realize from 
aggregation’s economies of scale, which is unlikely to be true at least 
when the defenses are individually negative-value.  
 De-aggregation is doctrinally viable for defendants. Under Rule 
20, the primary tool for defendant aggregation, joinder is permitted 
when “any right to relief is asserted against [the defendants] jointly, 
severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the 
same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions and occurrenc-
es.”181 Although courts only require a “logical relationship” for events 
to be part of the same transaction or occurrence,182 they have narrow-
ly defined from what events the “right to relief” arises, requiring that 
there be a “logical relationship” in the defendants’ activities that al-
legedly violate the legal duty.183 Even though the right to relief argu-
ably arises out of each of the four elements of a prototypical legal 
claim—(1) a violation of (2) a legal duty that (3) causes (4) harm to 
the plaintiff—courts generally have held that a logical relationship in 
the events giving rise to the legal duty (e.g., the issuance of the pa-
tent)184 or the harm caused to the plaintiff (e.g., the stealing of the 
same broadcast signal without paying for the rights)185 is insufficient 
for joinder.186 This interpretation of Rule 20 favors joinder of multiple 
unrelated plaintiffs suing a single defendant, where it is more likely 
that the defendant’s alleged violation of the legal duty is the same or 
factually related for all plaintiffs (e.g., the same allegedly illegal 
practice or policy). By contrast, for a single plaintiff suing multiple 
unrelated defendants, the defendants’ alleged violations of the legal 
                                                                                                                  
 181. FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(2)(A) (emphasis added). 
 182. Mosley v. Gen. Motors Corp., 497 F.2d 1330, 1333 (8th Cir. 1974); WRIGHT, 
MILLER & KANE, supra note 61, § 1653, at 409. 
 183. See, e.g., In re EMC Corp., 677 F.3d 1351, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (requiring that 
“the defendants’ allegedly infringing acts” share operative facts to satisfy logical relation-
ship test); Nassau Cnty. Ass’n of Ins. Agents, v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 497 F.2d 1151, 1154 
(2d Cir. 1974) (finding no logical relationship because defendants’ allegedly wrongful ac-
tions were “separate and unrelated”). 
 184. See, e.g., Androphy v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 620, 623 (N.D. Ill. 
1998) (allegations of infringement of same patents “does not mean the claims against the 
two companies arise from a common transaction or occurrence”); see also Nassau Cnty., 497 
F.2d at 1154 (“violations of the same statutory duty” are not enough to permit joinder 
(quoting Kenvin v. Newburger, Loeb & Co., 37 F.R.D. 473, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 1965))). 
 185. McFarland, supra note 55, at 268-69; see also Colt Def. LLC v. Heckler & Koch 
Def., Inc., No. 2:04CV258, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28690, at *12 (E.D. Va. Oct. 22, 2004) 
(rejecting argument that transaction or occurrence requirement was satisfied because both 
defendants were “attempting to commit ‘genericide’ on Colt’s M4 trademark”). 
 186. Consolidation under Rule 42(a) and the multi-district litigation statute only re-
quire a common question, but courts tend to require a degree of similarity approaching 
what is required of permissive joinder. See supra Part III.A. In fact, when Congress prohib-
ited joinder of similarly situated patent defendants, it also prohibited consolidation for trial 
even though such claims certainly possess the single common question required by the 
plain language of Rule 42(a). See 35 U.S.C. § 299(a) (Supp. V 2011). 
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duty are unlikely to be factually related, even if similar (e.g., develop-
ing and selling different products alleged to infringe the same patent).  
D.   Cognitive Limitations 
 Cost and substantive explanations only partially explain defend-
ants’ widespread resistance to being aggregated. Since defendants 
should realize significant economies of scale from being aggregated 
and, in some cases, lack economic or strategic reasons to oppose col-
lective resolution, perhaps defendants’ opposition to being aggregated 
is not fully motivated by rational concerns. Information problems 
may exist, with defendants and their counsel unaware of the benefits 
of being aggregated (given that defendant aggregation is rare and 
novel compared to plaintiff aggregation) or failing to adequately dis-
tinguish between plaintiff aggregation (which is generally against 
defendants’ interests) and defendant aggregation (which often aligns 
with defendants’ interests). 
 Alternatively, some of the resistance to defendant aggregation 
may result from cognitive biases—biases and aversions that can lead 
to inaccurate perceptions of what is and is not in defendants’ inter-
est.187 There is good reason to think that cognitive biases are part of 
the explanation, as the resistance to defendant aggregation has been 
vehement even though the economic and strategic arguments are, at 
best, ambiguous. Anecdotal evidence points to three relevant cogni-
tive limitations: bias against forced groups, self-serving biases, and 
loss aversion. 
1.   Involuntary Groups 
 Research in a variety of fields indicates that, compared to individ-
uals, groups perform better, make better decisions, and are better 
problem-solvers.188 Admittedly, aggregated plaintiffs generally choose 
their litigation group,189 whereas similarly situated defendants  
                                                                                                                  
 187. Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to 
Law and Economics, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 13, 14-15 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 
2000); Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction to BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 1, 3-5 (Cass R. 
Sunstein ed., 2000) [hereinafter Sunstein, Introduction]. 
 188. See Martin Kocher et al., Individual or Team Decision-Making—Causes and Con-
sequences of Self-Selection, 56 GAMES AND ECON. BEHAV. 259, 259-60, 268 (2006). See gen-
erally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA: HOW MANY MINDS PRODUCE KNOWLEDGE (2006) (dis-
cussing how aggregating knowledge and perspectives can produce more accurate infor-
mation and decisions). 
 189. See Freer, supra note 66, at 823-24. Joinder by definition requires a voluntary 
choice by plaintiffs. Id. Common-question class actions include an opt-out mechanism, 
while other types of class actions normally track groups that pre-date litigation. See Eliza-
beth Chamblee Burch, Aggregation, Community, and the Line Between, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 
889, 890-92 (2010) (describing, though questioning, reliance on pre-existing groups). Con-
solidation via Rule 42(a) or multi-district litigation can be initiated by the court sua sponte 
or on a defendant’s motion, but plaintiffs are more likely to initiate these procedures. See 
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normally are forced to litigate together by the plaintiff with no ability 
to avoid group litigation if the requisite commonality in the claims  
is present.190 Yet, research demonstrates that self-selection of groups 
is not a prerequisite for successful group performance and involun-
tarily selected groups are as capable of successful and cohesive per-
formance as voluntarily selected groups.191 Thus, a rational defendant 
would seem to prefer litigating as part of a defendant group, rather 
than individually.  
 Despite these benefits of even involuntary groups, people are often 
biased against working in forced groups, resisting participation, ex-
pressing skepticism of the group’s objectives, showing distrust of fel-
low group members, being less cooperative, and being worse at re-
solving conflicts.192 These biases against forced groupings are exacer-
bated when, as with aggregated defendants, the group is chosen by 
an adversary, not a neutral. “Reactive devaluation” suggests that 
“proposals made by adversaries will be valued lower than identical 
proposals made by a neutral party or a member of one’s own group”193 
as a result of zero-sum or fixed-pie bias (i.e., the assumption that a 
gain for the opponent equals a loss for self).194  
 To overcome initial biases and perform effectively, an involuntary 
group often requires a collective goal that generates a task-based co-
hesion.195 Aggregated defendants lack an inherently collective goal, 
as each defendant’s goal is to defeat the plaintiff’s claim with what-
ever combination of individual and common defenses is best for that 
                                                                                                                  
Olson, supra note 66, at 360-63; Notice of Hearing Session, (J.M.P.L. July 25, 2013) (MDL No. 
875), available at http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/Hearing_Order-7-25-13.pdf (list-
ing plaintiff as moving party for multi-district proceedings in twelve of sixteen matters). 
 190. See Freer, supra note 66, at 823-26; Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 23, at 1522. 
 191. See Dwight R. Norris & Robert E. Niebuhr, Group Variables and Gaming Success, 
11 SIMULATION & GAMES 301, 306-09 (1980). 
 192. See, e.g., Ronald Rooney & Michael Chovanec, Involuntary Groups, in HANDBOOK 
OF SOCIAL WORK WITH GROUPS 212, 215-16 (Charles D. Garvin et al. eds., 2004) (involun-
tary psychotherapy groups); Work with Involuntary Groups, in STRATEGIES FOR WORK 
WITH INVOLUNTARY CLIENTS 244, 246, 256 (Ronald H. Rooney ed., 2d ed. 2009) (involuntary 
psychotherapy groups); Donald R. Bacon et al., Lessons from the Best and Worst Student 
Team Experiences: How a Teacher Can Make the Difference, 23 J. MGMT. EDUC. 467, 468, 
482 (1999) (management/business education); Kenneth J. Chapman et al., Can’t We Pick 
Our Own Groups? The Influence of Group Selection Method on Group Dynamics and Out-
comes, 30 J. MGMT. EDUC. 557, 565 (2006) (management/business education); Paul Miesing 
& John F. Preble, Group Processes and Performance in a Complex Business Simulation, 16 
SMALL GROUP BEHAV. 325, 334-36 (1985) (management/business education). 
 193. Maurits Barendrecht & Berend R. de Vries, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss with 
Sticky Defaults: Failure in the Market for Dispute Resolution Services?, 7 CARDOZO J. 
CONFLICT RESOL. 83, 96-97 (2005). 
 194. See Robert S. Adler, Flawed Thinking: Addressing Decision Biases in Negotiation, 
20 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 683, 740-42 (2005). 
 195. Norris & Niebuhr, supra note 191, at 306-09. 
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defendant, regardless of the outcome for the rest of the group.196 In 
fact, aggregated defendants that are competitors have an incentive to 
favor individual defenses over class or general defenses exactly be-
cause they can prevail without benefitting their competitors.197  
 Anecdotal evidence supports the intuition that biases against in-
voluntary groups create resistance to defendant aggregation. De-
fendants seeking de-aggregation have argued “that it is inherently 
unfair to join separate defendants in the same proceeding when they 
are competitors,”198 that is, to force a group where none would other-
wise exist. Similarly, even though Rule 20 focuses on the relationship 
of the claims, arguments often focus on the lack of relationship or ex-
istence of competition among the defendants, that is, the lack of a pre-
existing group, even when the claims have common roots.199  
2.   Self-Serving Bias 
 Aside from, or perhaps in conjunction with, biases against forced 
groupings, “[p]eople tend to make judgments about themselves, their 
abilities, and their beliefs that are ‘egocentric’ or ‘self-serving.’ ”200 
This bias can manifest itself in several ways, including “a tendency 
for people to see themselves as having a greater than average share 
of some desirable quality” or “skewed predictions; that which is de-
sired is thought more likely to occur than that which is undesired.”201 
Applied to the litigation context, self-serving bias suggests that “liti-
gants, their lawyers, and other stakeholders might overestimate 
their own abilities, the quality of their advocacy, and the relative 
merits of the positions they are advocating.”202  
 In the litigation context, egocentrism is most commonly applied to 
explain settlement failures,203 but it also suggests that each defend-
ant will over-value the strength of its own defense and each defense 
                                                                                                                  
 196. See Ford, supra note 156, at 93-112; see also Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 
23, at 1483 (categorizing defenses into general, class, and individual). 
 197. See Ford, supra note 156, at 109-12. 
 198. Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. Theglobe.com, Inc., 233 F.R.D. 615, 617 (D. Kan. 2006) 
(emphasis added).  
 199. See, e.g., Spread Spectrum Screening, LLC v. Eastman Kodak Co., No. 10 C 1101, 
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90549, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 1, 2010) (noting alleged common roots 
between each defendant’s accused product, but emphasizing that “Kodak and Heidelberg 
are business competitors of one another” in rejecting joinder); Pergo, Inc. v. Alloc, Inc., 262 
F. Supp. 2d 122, 128 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).  
 200. Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Insurers, Illusions of Judgment & Litiga-
tion, 59 VAND. L. REV. 2017, 2042 (2006). 
 201. Ward Farnsworth, The Legal Regulation of Self-Serving Bias, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 567, 569-70 (2003). 
 202. Guthrie & Rachlinski, supra note 200, at 2044. 
 203. Linda Babcock et al., Creating Convergence: Debiasing Biased Litigants, 22 LAW & 
SOC. INQUIRY 913, 922-23 (1997). 
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attorney will over-value her own abilities and strategies. This has 
two important consequences for defendant aggregation. First, even 
absent a rational reason to assume a stronger defense than co-
defendants, an egocentric defendant will perceive aggregation as det-
rimentally mixing its “stronger” position with the “weaker” positions 
of the co-defendants. Second, if each defendant (and defense attor-
ney) is overly confident in her own strategy, compromise will be more 
difficult when coordinated action is required, leading to conflict and 
increased coordination costs. Similarly, an egocentric defense attor-
ney will be more likely to duplicate efforts (e.g., ask her own ques-
tions at depositions, revise every joint brief, etc.) rather than divide 
labor and trust the work of other defense lawyers perceived as of 
lower quality. This again increases coordination costs. Although 
plaintiffs and plaintiffs’ attorneys should be subject to similar self-
serving biases, contingent fee arrangements necessitate the division 
of labor and reduction of coordination costs to maximize fees. Plain-
tiffs’ attorneys’ economic incentives thus mitigate egocentrism.  
 Anecdotal evidence again supports the role of egocentrism in mul-
ti-defendant cases. Practitioners report that managing aggregated 
defendants in patent litigation “can sometimes be like herding cats, 
with each defendant wanting to go in its own direction. Clients and 
their counsel may have differing strategies, and it can be necessary 
to remind co-defendants that healthy compromise may be necessary 
to get everyone rowing in the same direction.”204  
3.   Loss Aversion 
 A common reaction to aggregation of similarly situated defendants 
is that the problems created by collective resolution are worse for ag-
gregated defendants, who face a potential judgment against them, 
than for aggregated plaintiffs, who only seek to obtain new bene-
fits.205 This reaction reflects loss aversion; that is, despite being econom-
ically equivalent, people “are more displeased with losses than they are 
pleased with equivalent gains – roughly [sic] speaking, twice as dis-
pleased.”206 As a result, defendants will care more about paying $100 in 
damages than plaintiffs will care about recovering $100 in damages.  
 Of course, loss aversion does not directly explain resistance to de-
fendant aggregation; if aggregation helps defendants, a loss-averse 
defendant should strongly favor it. But loss aversion does seem rele-
                                                                                                                  
 204. Baghdassarian & Frankel, supra note 151. 
 205. Cf. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 810-11 (1985) (suggesting that 
due process protections are greater for defendants than plaintiffs because “an adverse 
judgment typically [will not] bind an absent plaintiff for any damages” even though it will 
“extinguish any of the plaintiff's claims which were litigated”). 
 206. Sunstein, Introduction, supra note 187, at 5. 
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vant in two ways. First, defendants are more likely to overvalue the 
potential problems with aggregation than are plaintiffs because they 
are more concerned about their potential loss than plaintiffs are 
about their potential gain. Second, the status quo is normally the ref-
erence point for determining whether something is a gain or loss.207 
The individual lawsuit is the status quo for all procedural rules,208 
particularly for the relatively uncommon and novel aggregation of 
similarly situated defendants. Thus, defendants are likely to over-
value the “losses” they realize from being aggregated (as compared to 
the individual lawsuit) and undervalue the gains.  
E.   Summary and the Role of Selection Effects 
 The justifications for defendants’ opposition to aggregation of simi-
larly situated defendants fall on a spectrum. At one end, collective 
resolution is clearly against defendants’ interests when the plaintiff’s 
claim is so small that it could not be profitably brought individually, 
such as in the BitTorrent copyright cases. Without aggregation, de-
fendants would never be sued.  
 At the other end, defendants have no economic or strategic rea-
sons to oppose being aggregated when there are asymmetric stakes, 
such that the plaintiff’s claim against each defendant would be indi-
vidually viable but each defendant’s cost of individual defense would 
be greater than its expected liability. These asymmetric stakes can 
arise, first, because the plaintiff has a cost advantage due to the less-
er amount of discoverable information in its possession or its ability 
to spread costs across multiple individual cases. This is often the case 
with patent trolls.209 Alternatively, asymmetric stakes exist when the 
plaintiff receives some additional benefit from the litigation beyond 
the damages paid by the defendant, such as the deterrence sought by 
the RIAA and DirecTV plaintiffs. A rational defendant in these cir-
cumstances would default or settle and is no worse off from aggrega-
tion regardless of any strategic consequences. To the contrary, these 
defendants are better off because the economies of scale that aggre-
gation offers increase the chances of a positive-value defense. Thus, 
cognitive biases are the only possible explanation for resistance to 
defendant aggregation when there are asymmetric stakes. 
 Between these two extremes lie cases where there is enough at 
stake to justify the plaintiff in bringing litigation individually and 
                                                                                                                  
 207. Id. at 6. 
 208. See David Marcus, From “Cases” to “Litigation” to “Contract”: A Comment on Sta-
bility in Civil Procedure, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1231, 1232 (2012). 
 209. See Coffee, supra note 145, at 899; see also In re Genentech, Inc., 566 F.3d 1338, 
1345 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (noting that patent defendants generally have more discoverable 
information than patentees). 
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each defendant to defend individually, as is true for most patent cas-
es, even those brought by so-called trolls. In these cases, objecting  
to being aggregated with similarly situated defendants may or may 
not be rational for a defendant, depending on the fact-specific ques-
tion of whether the strategic benefits of, for example, asymmetric 
preclusion or avoiding jury confusion outweigh the economies of scale 
of a collective defense. Part III.C suggests that the strategic consid-
erations often will not outweigh the economies of scale aggregation 
and therefore defendants opposing aggregation in these cases often 
will be acting irrationally.  
 Perhaps selection effects provide a simple explanation for why de-
fendants oppose being aggregated. The plaintiff generally controls 
whether or not to aggregate defendants,210 and it is reasonable to 
think that aggregation only occurs when it is in the plaintiff’s self-
interest and, presumably, against the defendants’ self-interest. De-
fendants’ consistent resistance to being aggregated thus may result 
from selection effects—they are only aggregated in those cases where 
it is detrimental to their interests. The limited cases in which the 
plaintiff aggregates defendants even when it is beneficial to defend-
ants may simply go unnoticed because no one objects to collective 
resolution. Although perfectly plausible, there are three reasons to 
doubt the simplicity of this explanation. 
 First, defendants appear to oppose aggregation even when it is not 
a self-interested choice by the plaintiff. Defendants have some mech-
anisms to seek aggregation even if the plaintiff chooses individual 
litigation, yet rarely use them.211 For example, in the RIAA and Di-
recTV cases where the plaintiff proceeded individually, the defend-
ants did not request consolidation or multi-district litigation. 
 Second, aggregated defendants have objected to collective resolu-
tion even in the category of cases in which they should favor it, that 
is, where a plaintiff with a positive-value claim sues a defendant with 
a negative-value defense. For example, patent defendants pushed for 
and obtained a blanket prohibition on joinder of similarly situated de-
fendants, even in the many patent troll cases where a cost-differential 
makes the patentee’s claim greater than its litigation costs but less 
than the defendant’s cost of defense. Similarly, the RIAA and DirecTV 
                                                                                                                  
 210. See Freer, supra note 66, at 823-26; Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 23, at 1522. 
 211. Defendants appear to be able to request defendant class treatment, yet virtually 
never do so. See Defendant Class Actions, supra note 20, at 630 n.3. Defendants also can 
seek permissive intervention in similarly situated defendants’ cases, but never do so. See 
Haley, supra note 162, at 334. Nor have similarly situated defendants made significant use 
of opportunities to aggregate themselves via Rule 42(a) or multi-district consolidation. See 
Olson, supra note 66, at 360-63; see also Notice of Hearing Session, (J.M.P.L. July 25, 2013) 
(MDL No. 875), available at http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/Hearing_Order-7-
25-13.pdf (listing plaintiff as moving party for multi-district proceedings in twelve of six-
teen matters). 
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defendants repeatedly opposed being aggregated despite their nega-
tive-value defenses and the likely positive-value claims. 
 Third, just because plaintiffs choose aggregation does not mean 
that it is against the defendants’ interest. Multiple lawsuits are more 
time-consuming and bothersome to the plaintiff than a single suit, 
regardless of the strategic benefits.212 Moreover, the plaintiff may 
have capital constraints that necessitate the immediate savings from 
a collective lawsuit even if the long-term benefits favor defendants, or 
the plaintiff may have agency problems if its lawyer realizes benefits 
from aggregating defendants that are not passed on to the plaintiff 
(e.g., less work in a contingency fee arrangement). Finally, aggrega-
tion is not necessarily zero-sum but instead may reduce the transac-
tion costs for both parties or offer both the plaintiff and defendants 
benefits that are not mutually exclusive. For example, a plaintiff su-
ing multiple defendants internalizes the entire risk from asymmetric 
preclusion, whereas each defendant only internalizes a part of the 
benefit, making elimination of asymmetric preclusion a greater gain 
for the plaintiff than loss for each defendant. Thus, both the plaintiff 
(from eliminating asymmetric preclusion) and the defendants (from 
economies of scale) could be better off from defendant aggregation. 
IV.   DEFENDANT AGGREGATION FROM THE SYSTEMIC PERSPECTIVE  
 Part III identified several potential problems with defendant ag-
gregation, finding them more limited or weaker than may be initially 
thought. But Part III focused only on whether defendant aggregation 
was problematic for defendants. That defendant aggregation may be 
bad for defendants in some circumstances tells us little about wheth-
er it is socially optimal. To the contrary, it may be socially optimal 
exactly because it is against defendants’ interest, for example, by in-
creasing the chances that wrongful conduct will be remedied. From a 
societal or systemic perspective, there are two key questions. The 
first is the economic question of whether aggregating similarly situ-
ated defendants makes litigation more efficient or more costly.213 The 
second is the substantive question of whether defendant aggregation 
promotes the substantive remedial scheme by increasing the chances 
that wrongdoers are found liable and innocent parties escape liability 
or whether defendant aggregation distorts the substantive remedial 
scheme by permitting wrongdoers to escape liability or by imposing 
liability on innocent actors.214  
                                                                                                                  
 212. See Freer, supra note 66, at 824 (arguing that plaintiffs are unlikely to omit defendants). 
 213. See Rosenberg, supra note 4, at 562-65. 
 214. See Nagareda, Discontents, supra note 134, at 1874-78. Common-question plaintiff 
class actions have been accused of distorting substantive law by increasing the costs of 
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 As discussed earlier, defendant aggregation is socially optimal 
from a theoretical perspective, as it eliminates duplicative litigation, 
promotes deterrence by permitting negative-value claims and defens-
es to be brought, and encourages resolution based on the merits, not 
costs.215 Yet, in practice, courts, policymakers, and commentators 
have been highly critical of efforts to aggregate similarly situated de-
fendants. This Part considers possible justifications for this systemic 
resistance, finding them insufficient to reject defendant aggregation 
wholesale but suggestive of the proper procedures for aggregating 
similarly situated defendants. The first three Sections consider 
whether systemic opposition to defendant aggregation is warranted 
based on its potential negative consequences for defendants, with 
Section A addressing the economic consequences for defendants, Sec-
tion B the substantive consequences for defendants, and Section C 
the possibility of capture by defendant interests. Section D considers, 
and rejects, the possibility that systemic resistance to defendant ag-
gregation is warranted based on negative consequences for judges or 
the judicial system.  
A.   Cost-Differentials, Weak Claims, and Unsympathetic Plaintiffs 
 Defendants sometimes have sound economic reasons to resist be-
ing aggregated, despite its theoretical economies of scale, because 
aggregation offers cost-savings to plaintiffs that allow litigation that 
otherwise would not be brought or accentuates pro-plaintiff cost-
differentials by imposing coordination costs on defendants.216 Howev-
er, the fact that aggregating defendants makes some otherwise nega-
tive-value claims viable is a reason for the judicial system to embrace 
defendant aggregation, not resist it, as this promotes optimal deter-
rence and secures faithful implementation of the substantive remedi-
al regime.217 Likewise, aggregated defendants’ potentially high coor-
dination costs are largely a result of defense attorneys’ fee struc-
ture,218 and systemic resistance is not warranted simply to preserve 
the fees of defense attorneys, countenance inefficient lawyer-client 
arrangements, or stifle innovation in fee arrangements. 
 However, courts and policymakers may be concerned that the ad-
ditional litigation and cost-differentials created by defendant aggre-
gation encourage strike suits, that is, non-meritorious claims that are 
                                                                                                                  
defense or increasing the risks of litigation through the massive potential liability. See 
Resnik, supra note 24, at 16. 
 215. See supra Part III.C. 
 216. See supra Parts IV.A-B. 
 217. See supra Part III.C.  
 218. See supra Part IV.B. 
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settled for less than the cost of defense.219 For example, one district 
court cited a BitTorrent plaintiff’s prior “abusive litigation practices,” 
“coercive settlements,” and “thus-far-unsubstantiated and perhaps 
erroneous allegation”220 in rejecting defendant joinder, while Con-
gress relied on “abusive” litigation practices by patent assertion enti-
ties to justify the patent anti-joinder provision.221 De-aggregation and 
re-filing may be seen as a way to eliminate individually negative-
value strike suits and make positive-value strike suits less profitable.  
 The Supreme Court recently cautioned against allowing merits 
questions to drive the aggregation decision.222 Addressing strike suits 
through de-aggregation has spillover effects, as it creates doctrine—
and in the case of patent law, statutory provisions—hostile to de-
fendant aggregation generally, foreclosing meritorious negative-value 
suits that promote the substantive remedial scheme and optimal de-
terrence. Courts have more direct means that are better tailored to 
addressing weak claims and strike suits, such as dismissal for failure 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,223 sanctions for 
harassing or frivolous litigation,224 and review of the merits before 
entering a default judgment.225 
 More troubling, courts’ concern with the multi-defendant suits 
may be that they are undesirable as a matter of policy, not that they 
lack legal merit.226 Multi-defendant cases have often involved unsym-
                                                                                                                  
 219. Next Phase Distrib., Inc. v. Does 1–27, 284 F.R.D. 165, 170-71 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) 
(“[T]he Court recognizes that joining 27 defendants, a substantial number of whom may 
have no liability in this case, in a copyright infringement case when the copyright itself 
might be deemed invalid, could prove to be a costly and futile exercise for Next Phase and 
the Court, and a damaging an [sic] unnecessary ordeal for the John Does.”); Taylor, supra 
note 7, at 674-75 (noting concern with strike suits in multi-defendant cases). 
 220. Digital Sins, Inc. v. Does 1–245, No. 11 Civ. 8170(CM), 2012 WL 1744838, at *3-4 
(S.D.N.Y. May 15, 2012). 
 221. Taylor, supra note 7, at 702. 
 222. See Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1194-95 
(2013) (“Rule 23 grants courts no license to engage in free-ranging merits inquiries at the 
certification stage. Merits questions may be considered to the extent—but only to the ex-
tent—that they are relevant to determining whether the Rule 23 prerequisites for class 
certification are satisfied.”). 
 223. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (describ-
ing what is needed for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim). 
 224. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2). 
 225. In re DIRECTV, Inc., No. C–02–5912–JW, 2004 WL 2645971, at *7-12 (N.D. Cal. 
July 26, 2004). 
 226. See Ingenuity 13 LLC v. Doe, No. 2:12–cv–8333–ODW (JCx), 2013 WL 1898633, at 
*1 (C.D. Cal. May 6, 2013) (noting that BitTorrent plaintiffs “outmaneuvered the legal 
system” by “discover[ing] the nexus of antiquated copyright laws, paralyzing social stigma, 
and unaffordable defense costs” (emphasis added)); DIRECTV, 2004 WL 2645971, at *7-12 
(finding that most of DirecTV’s claims had sufficient legal merit to warrant a default judg-
ment); Karunaratne, supra note 14, at 303 (noting that file-sharing plaintiffs “generally 
have legitimate substantive grounds for their allegations of copyright infringement” but 
still suggesting need to make litigation less profitable for them). 
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pathetic plaintiffs: patent trolls;227 the “porno-trolling” BitTorrent 
plaintiffs accused of fraud, extortion, and exploiting antiquated copy-
right laws and social stigma;228 and large corporate interests like Di-
recTV and the RIAA suing individuals or small businesses.229 Many 
today view: patents as too prevalent or too broad;230 copyright as a 
poor fit for the internet;231 and large corporate interests suing finan-
cially limited individuals as not a proper use of judicial resources.232  
 Using de-aggregation as a de facto reform of substantive law is 
inconsistent with the ideal that “the format for the resolution of civil 
disputes . . . should not alter substantive law.”233 Of course, it would 
not be the first time that “[t]he affording or withholding of aggregate 
treatment . . . operates as a backdoor vehicle to restructure the re-
medial scheme in applicable substantive law.”234 However, judicial 
nullification of substantive law via de-aggregation hinders the devel-
opment of substantive law. Legislators who know judges will use pro-
cedural tools to avoid implementation of substantive law when it 
seems the most unfair or antiquated will have little incentive to un-
dertake efforts to repeal or amend the law. For example, to the extent 
that the patent anti-joinder provision decreases litigation by patent 
assertion entities, it could relieve some of the pressure on Congress 
or the Federal Circuit to adjust substantive patent law doctrines that 
create broad patents, even though the problem of broad patents is not 
limited to multi-defendant cases or patent assertion entities.  
B.   Substantive Effects, Fairness, Autonomy, and Due Process 
Aside from its effects on litigation costs, defendants’ resistance to 
being aggregated may be motivated by non-economic concerns. Three 
of defendants’ possible concerns are clearly inapplicable from the sys-
temic perspective. Asymmetric preclusion, though potentially benefi-
cial to defendants, is generally seen as undesirable from a systemic 
perspective because it encourages gamesmanship and duplicative 
                                                                                                                  
 227. See Bryant, supra note 23, at 690-94. 
 228. See Ingenuity, 2013 WL 1898633, at *1. 
 229. See supra Part III.D.2-3. 
 230. See, e.g., Charles Duhigg & Steve Lohr, The Patent, Used as a Sword, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 7, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/08/technology/patent-wars-among-tech-gia 
nts-can-stifle-competition.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 231. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Real Copyright Reform, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1, 1 (2010). 
 232. See, e.g., Opderbeck, supra note 123, at 1727. 
 233. Nagareda, Discontents, supra note 134, at 1874-78.  
 234. Id. at 1877-78. Professor Nagareda argues “that aggregate procedure is under 
constant pressure—sometimes from plaintiffs and sometimes from defendants—to serve as 
the vehicle for reform of underlying substantive law through means other than actual re-
form legislation.” Id. at 1877. 
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litigation. Aggregation procedures are often justified exactly because 
they eliminate asymmetries in the preclusive effect of judgments.235  
 Similarly, doctrinal opportunities to de-aggregate may offer de-
fendants some benefits and may explain some recent court decisions 
taking a narrow doctrinal focus,236 but they do not explain why  
the doctrine developed or has persisted in this manner, or why Con-
gress has endorsed the doctrine. Permitting joinder based on overlap 
in the underlying legal duty or the harm caused to the plaintiff, not 
just the defendants’ allegedly unlawful conduct, is equally consistent 
with Rule 20’s plain language and policy goal, that is, promoting effi-
ciency by avoiding separate litigation where there is a substantial 
evidentiary overlap.237 
 Finally, judges and policymakers are not immune from cognitive 
biases,238 but biases against participation in involuntary groups, self-
serving biases, and loss aversion more directly explain why defend-
ants would conclude aggregation is against their interests than why 
judges or policymakers would.239  
 On the other hand, the risk of judicial or jury confusion is a signif-
icant systemic concern and is often cited by courts in ordering de-
aggregation.240 Allowing a defendant to be found liable, or escape lia-
bility, simply because the jury or judge misattributed evidence or ar-
guments against another defendant could distort the substantive re-
medial regime. Of course what this means for defendant aggregation 
depends on how strong and extensive this risk is and whether the 
other ways in which aggregation promotes the substantive remedial 
scheme are greater than the distortions created by confusion. In any 
event, courts’ severance orders, as well as Congress’s patent  
anti-joinder provision, are written broadly to bar aggregation of simi-
larly situated defendants generally, even in the many situations in 
                                                                                                                  
 235. See 18A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4464, at 692-93 (2d ed. 2002); Developments in the 
Law, supra note 64, at 1394. 
 236. See Taylor, supra note 7, at 701. 
 237. See McFarland, supra note 55, at 268-70; see also Kane, supra note 66, at 1729-30, 
1746 (explaining that the policy goal of joinder rules is to encourage efficient resolution of 
claims, especially when there is factual overlap). 
 238. See Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 778 (2001). 
 239. See supra Part III.D.1–3. On the other hand, courts in other contexts have been 
skeptical of forced associations. See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640,  
648 (2000) (right of expressive organizations to exclude members); Jay M. Feinman,  
The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118 (1976)  
(employment relationships). 
 240. See, e.g., Colt Def. LLC v. Heckler & Koch Def., Inc., No. 2:04CV258, 2004 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 28690, at *15 (E.D. Va. Oct. 22, 2004). 
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which there is little risk of problematic confusion.241 Moreover, courts 
and policymakers have more tailored ways to address potential  
confusion short of de-aggregation, such as requiring that common 
questions predominate or satisfy some other threshold of similarity, 
asking whether individual issues are so prevalent as to make aggre-
gate resolution unduly burdensome,242 or holding separate trials for 
individual issues.243 
 There also seems to be some sense that aggregating similarly sit-
uated defendants is unfair or contrary to due process. This largely 
reflects concerns about forced groupings, autonomy, or potential con-
fusion that have already been addressed. There may be some addi-
tional belief that defendants facing liability are entitled to pursue 
whatever strategy they choose without having to compromise or be 
affected by defendants pursuing other strategies. This contention is 
doubtful. Even without aggregation, defendants will often be effec-
tively bound by the strategic decisions of earlier defendants via prin-
ciples like stare decisis, and it is equally unfair to require earlier de-
fendants to bear the burden of defense alone.244 Moreover, extreme 
defendant autonomy creates externalities unfair to third parties by 
consuming judicial resources that otherwise could be spent on other 
cases or other socially beneficial activities. Admittedly, joint resolu-
tion of individual issues and judicial case management procedures 
that limit the ability of defendants to present defenses on individual 
issues may raise greater fairness or due process concerns, but this 
problem is with the aggregation procedures, not aggregation itself. 
C.   Capture 
 Even if the potential problems aggregation creates for defendants 
are not troubling from a systemic perspective, these concerns could 
still explain systemic resistance based on a “capture” theory. Public 
choice theory predicts that policy outcomes will favor concentrated 
groups with high individual stakes, such as organized corporate in-
terests, because more diffuse interests, such as taxpayers, consum-
ers, or citizens, generally suffer greater free-rider problems and are 
more difficult to mobilize.245 Because defendants are more likely to be 
                                                                                                                  
 241. See Taylor, supra note 7, at 708-15 (describing situations where joinder is likely 
not permitted despite little risk of harmful confusion regarding patent infringement); su-
pra Part IV.C.2. 
 242. See Erbsen, supra note 28, at 1002. 
 243. See, e.g., Jaime Dodge, Disaggregative Mechanisms: The New Frontier of Mass-
Claims Resolution Without Class Actions, 63 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2014), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2243032. 
 244. See supra Part IV.C.1. 
 245. See Daniel A. Farber, Introduction to PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW ix, x (Dan-
iel A. Farber ed., 2007). 
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large corporate interests and plaintiffs to be individuals, public 
choice theory would predict that procedural rules are more likely to 
reflect the interests of defendants than plaintiffs. 
 For example, Congress is widely seen as enacting the anti-joinder 
provision for patent cases at the behest of corporate interests, largely 
in the high technology area, which are frequently targeted by small 
patent assertion entities.246 However, in other prominent examples, 
concentrated corporate plaintiffs (e.g., DirecTV and RIAA) sought to 
aggregate diffuse individual defendants.247 Therefore, resistance to 
defendant aggregation is the opposite of public choice predictions. 
Moreover, the public choice literature debates to what extent the in-
dependent judiciary is subject to interest group pressures.248 
 Whatever the descriptive power of public choice theory for system-
ic opposition to defendant aggregation, it does not provide a norma-
tively sound justification on which to deny aggregation of similarly 
situated defendants. However, it does provide an important insight. 
Overcoming systemic resistance to defendant aggregation and obtain-
ing the efficiencies and other benefits it offers likely requires blunt-
ing defendants’ opposition to being aggregated. Thus, a procedural 
mechanism that mitigates the problems for defendants created by 
aggregation is more likely to be adopted and be effective in practice. 
D.   Judicial Self-Interest 
 A judge may resist aggregating defendants, not because it is 
against defendants’ interests, but because it is against the judge’s 
own self-interest.249 In granting de-aggregation, judges sometimes 
cite self-interested justifications that are weak from a disinterested 
perspective, such as the plaintiff’s circumvention of filing fees or the 
single credit the judge gets for purposes of caseload distribution.250   
 Judges also often cite concerns that multi-defendant cases will 
require too much effort to manage, contending, for example, that ag-
gregation lacks “litigation economies” because each defendant “is 
                                                                                                                  
 246. See Bryant, supra note 23, at 701-02 & n.102. 
 247. See supra Part II.D.2-3. 
 248. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an 
Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875 (1975), reprinted in PUBLIC CHOICE AND 
PUBLIC LAW 22, 22-24 (Daniel A. Farber ed., 2007).  
 249. See Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing 
Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1 (1993). On the other hand, aggregation 
(whether of plaintiffs or defendants) may be in judges’ self-interest, since handling “big” 
cases is a way for a judge to enhance prestige and reputation. Id. at 13-15. 
 250. Order Severing Parties Due to Misjoinder and Dismissing All but the First Named 
Defendant at 2, Finisar Corp. v. Source Photonics, Inc., No. C 10–00032 WHA (N.D. Cal. 
dismissed May 5, 2010).  
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likely to have some individual defense to assert.”251 Of course, the fact 
that there may be “some individual defense” says little about litigation 
economies without also considering the common questions that exist, 
the relative importance of common and individual questions in the 
particular case, and the ability to efficiently resolve individual ques-
tions through means short of de-aggregation, such as separate trials. 
 Moreover, the concern that multi-defendant litigation is too com-
plex to handle collectively reflects a narrow focus on the self-interest 
of the individual judge in the aggregated proceedings, rather than 
the interests of the judiciary as a whole. Individual litigation requires 
resolution of both individual and common issues for each defendant. 
By contrast, aggregate litigation allows resolution of common issues 
collectively for all defendants, even if it still necessitates some form 
of separate proceedings to resolve individual issues. Unless common 
issues are minor, greater systemic efficiency should result from ag-
gregate proceedings (even if individual issues must be addressed 
separately) than individual proceedings (where both individual and 
common issues must be addressed separately). Managing individual 
issues in aggregate litigation may be more work for the individual 
judge, but it normally will be less work for judges as a whole than 
numerous individual cases. Thus, concerns about the complexity of 
aggregated litigation are unpersuasive from a systemic perspective. 
V.   OVERCOMING RESISTANCE TO DEFENDANT AGGREGATION 
 To this point, this Article has focused on the why (and the what) of 
defendant aggregation, explaining that aggregating defendants is 
socially desirable because it can improve efficiency, deterrence, and 
compensation. This Part turns to the how of defendant aggregation, 
identifying how defendant aggregation can be implemented while 
minimizing the problems it may create. Minimizing the problems 
from aggregation both enhances its social desirability and, more 
pragmatically, increases the chances that courts and policymakers 
will actually permit collective resolution of claims against similarly 
situated defendants.  
 This Part does not purport to definitively resolve the proper pro-
cedural mechanism for aggregating defendants, nor does it purport to 
work out all of the logistical considerations. That will have to wait for 
further work, debate, and practical experience. Rather, this Part has 
three goals: to question the common assumption that defendant ag-
gregation is synonymous with defendant class actions, to identify key 
                                                                                                                  
 251. Digital Sins, Inc. v. Does 1–245, No. 11 Civ. 8170(CM), 2012 WL 1744838, at *3 
(S.D.N.Y. May 15, 2002) (emphasis added); see also Next Phase Distribution, Inc. v. Does 
1–27, 284 F.R.D. 165, 169-70 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Colt Def. LLC v. Heckler & Koch Def., Inc., 
No. 2:04CV258, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28690, at *15-16 (E.D. Va. Oct. 22, 2004). 
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principles to guide design of defendant aggregation procedures, and 
to sketch the initial outlines of a procedural mechanism that imple-
ments these principles: inter-district related case coordination.  
A.   Principles of a Defendant Aggregation Procedure 
 Regardless of the precise details, a procedural mechanism for ag-
gregating similarly situated defendants should be non-
representative, subject to centralized (neutral) control and limited to 
common issues. These features will both optimize defendant aggrega-
tion and reduce the resistance from defendants, courts, and policy-
makers that stands as a practical obstacle to achieving the benefits of 
defendant aggregation. 
1.   Non-Representative Aggregation 
 Commentators often assume that if defendants are to be aggre-
gated, the procedure must track the most common form of plaintiff 
aggregation: the class action.252 This is probably unsurprising given 
the scholarly, political, and popular obsession with the class action. 
Yet, the possibilities for aggregation are far richer than just the repre-
sentative class action and include procedures that permit collective 
resolution while offering much greater protection for individual inter-
ests than the class action, like joinder and multi-district litigation.253  
 Admittedly, the class defense is probably the mechanism for ag-
gregating defendants with the lowest litigation costs, since treating 
the defendants as a unitary body with centralized representation 
maximizes cost-savings and cost-spreading, while minimizing coordi-
nation costs.254 But it also accentuates the substantive concerns with 
aggregating similarly situated defendants. Because it minimizes the 
individualized nature of the claims and defenses, it increases the 
chances of jury confusion and the possibility that evidence will be 
misattributed in a way that improperly imposes or excuses liability.255  
 Moreover, a class defense is a representative procedure that would 
impose liability on absent defendants based on the decisions and 
strategies pursued by other defendants and their chosen counsel. 
This raises autonomy concerns (to those who emphasize individual 
                                                                                                                  
 252. See, e.g., Hamdani & Klement, supra note 4; Netto, supra note 21; Shen, supra 
note 22; Simpson & Perra, supra note 20; Matthew K.K. Sumida, Note, Defendant Class 
Actions and Patent Infringement Litigation, 58 UCLA L. REV. 843, 853-57 (2011). But see 
Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 23, at 1513-15 (semi-voluntary joinder); Edward Hsieh, 
Note, Mandatory Joinder: An Indirect Method for Improving Patent Quality, 77 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 683 (2004). 
 253. See supra Part III.A. 
 254. See Hamdani & Klement, supra note 4, at 711-13. 
 255. See Erbsen, supra note 28, at 1009-14 (recognizing the problem of jury confusion 
in context of plaintiff class actions). 
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autonomy)256 and is likely to generate practical opposition from  
defendants, courts, and policymakers. Of course, defendants could be 
permitted to opt out,257 minimizing autonomy concerns, but this 
would likely undermine the practical benefits of defendant aggrega-
tion. Many defendants likely would opt out because: the plaintiff’s 
claims would not be individually viable; other self-interested reasons 
exist; or self-serving biases make them unwilling to hand over  
control of their defense to the class representative.258 If opting out 
were not permitted, a mandatory class defense would likely run afoul 
of due process protections, at least if damages were at stake,259 as 
well as raise serious concerns about jury confusion, autonomy, and 
involuntary groupings.  
 Thus, defendant aggregation is unlikely to be adopted by courts 
and policymakers in practice unless it uses a non-representative pro-
cedure—more akin to joinder, consolidation, or multi-district litiga-
tion—where the claim against each defendant remains separate and 
each defendant can retain its own lawyer and make its own decision 
regarding settlement.   
2.   Centralized Control Over Aggregation 
 Professor Richard Freer has argued that aggregation generally 
should be controlled by a neutral judge, rather than the plaintiff, to 
minimize duplicative litigation, maximize efficiency, and avoid the 
whims of the plaintiff’s strategic interests.260 Centralized neutral con-
trol is a particularly sound principle for defendant aggregation. 
Plaintiff aggregation is generally in the interest of plaintiffs, and 
therefore the plaintiffs’ incentives will normally line up with the sys-
                                                                                                                  
 256. See, e.g., REDISH, supra note 48, at 169-73 (raising autonomy concerns in context 
of plaintiff class actions). 
 257. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(v). 
 258. Hamdani and Klement struggle with opt-out. They suggest that plaintiffs opt out 
only in low numbers and conclude that this will likely be true of defendants, overlooking 
the effects of loss aversion on defendants. See Hamdani & Klement, supra note 4, at 725. 
Although they suggest that defendants are unlikely to opt out because they will not want 
to identify themselves to the plaintiff, in the primary examples of defendant aggregation, 
the defendants were either already known to the plaintiff (patent and DirecTV litigation) 
or easily identifiable through other means (subpoenas to ISPs in the file-sharing litigation). 
See id. at 722. Moreover, because claims against similarly situated defendants normally 
involve money damages, the potential defendants would already need to be identified for 
purposes of notice if they are to be bound by the class judgment. See FED. R. CIV. P. 
23(c)(2)(B); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811-13 (1985). Ultimately, 
Hamdani and Klement acknowledge that “[t]he barriers to opting out pose a major chal-
lenge to the legitimacy of the class defense as the opt-out option is important in preserving 
due process rights.” Hamdani & Klement, supra note 4, at 722. 
 259. See Phillips Petroleum, 472 U.S. at 811-13; see also Netto, supra note 21, at 68 
(proposing mandatory defendant class actions without considering opt-out and due 
process requirements). 
 260. See Freer, supra note 66, at 812-13. 
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temic interest in collective resolution.261 By contrast, who benefits 
from defendant aggregation is more complex and dependent on the 
facts of particular cases; therefore, the plaintiffs’ incentives will not 
always correspond to the systemic interest in collective resolution.262 
 Defendant aggregation at the plaintiff’s behest, such as permissive 
joinder, has provoked resistance from defendants, courts, and poli-
cymakers. The different stakeholders likely resist aggregation be-
cause the plaintiff is perceived as aggregating only when it benefits 
and when the defendants suffer from aggregation. Alternatively, re-
sistance could stem from biases against forced groupings, reactive 
devaluation, and zero-sum biases.263 On the other hand, defendant 
aggregation at the defendants’ behest, as some have suggested, 
wound tend to be underutilized, as is true of the existing procedures 
defendants have to aggregate themselves.264 Self-interested concerns 
and self-serving biases would lead defendants to think they were bet-
ter off litigating alone.265 Finally, if the aggregation decision were left 
to the individual presiding judge, the self-interest of that judge may 
cause him or her to reject aggregation even when beneficial to the 
judicial system as a whole. 
 Thus, to best overcome obstacles to defendant aggregation, a cen-
tralized body representing the judicial system’s interests should be 
provided with information about related cases and then allowed to 
determine sua sponte whether to aggregate them.266 
3.   Issue-Only Aggregation 
 Most aggregative devices presumptively apply to entire cases, not 
merely common issues. Permissive joinder applies to entire cases, 
though a court is permitted to order separate trials or take other pre-
cautions “to protect a party [from] embarrassment, delay, expense, or 
other prejudice . . . .”267 Similarly, the multi-district litigation statute 
generally provides for transfer of the entire “civil action[],” though 
the statute allows the panel to separate and remand “any claim, 
cross-claim, counter-claim, or third-party claim” to the original 
judge.268 At the same time, the Judicial Panel on Multi-District Liti-
gation has concluded that it “does not have power to separate issues 
                                                                                                                  
 261. See supra Part III.E. 
 262. See supra Part III.E. 
 263. See supra Part III. 
 264. See Freer, supra note 66, at 823-26; Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 23, at 1522. 
 265. See supra Part III. 
 266. Cf. Freer, supra note 66, at 841-51 (proposing duty to notify court of potential 
duplicative litigation and court determination of whether to “package” litigation). 
 267. FED. R. CIV. P. 20(b). 
 268. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012). 
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in civil actions, assigning one or more to the transferee court and one 
or more to transferor courts.”269 Although Rule 23 appears to provide 
for class actions limited to specific common issues, with resolution of 
other issues left for subsequent individual cases, issue class actions re-
main an exception.270 Consolidation under Rule 42(a) is the only aggre-
gative device that does not presumptively apply to the entire case.271    
 When entire cases are aggregated, a mix of common and individu-
al issues will exist, creating concerns about fact-finder confusion, 
fairness and autonomy, and coordination costs. Moreover, the differ-
ent portfolio of individual and common defenses possessed by each 
defendant can hinder the development of a shared-task focus to over-
come bias against forced groupings and can create room for egocen-
tric perceptions of the relative strengths of the different defendants’ 
positions. Limiting aggregation to common issues, with individual 
issues resolved separately outside of the group litigation, eliminates 
or minimizes these problems.  
B.   Inter-District Related Case Coordination 
1.   Overview of Inter-District Coordination 
 Multi-district litigation is a good starting point for a defendant 
aggregation procedure because it offers a non-representative struc-
ture, uses a centralized, neutral body to make the aggregation deci-
sion, and allows the exercise of nationwide jurisdiction and venue.272 
However, multi-district litigation suffers from three shortcomings 
that undermine its effectiveness for aggregating similarly situated 
defendants. First, in practice, multi-district litigation only happens 
at the request of one of the parties, with only four percent of proceed-
ings initiated via the panel’s authority to order aggregation sua spon-
te.273 Second, multi-district litigation normally applies to entire cases, 
                                                                                                                  
 269. In re A.H. Robins Co., 610 F. Supp. 1099, 1101 (J.P.M.L. 1985); see also 15 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER & RICHARD D. FREER, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3862, at 451 (3d ed. 2013) (“The ability to subdivide 
a case is limited . . . . The Panel will not separate and transfer discrete issues for [multi-
district litigation] . . . .”). 
 270. See Jon Romberg, Half a Loaf is Predominant and Superior to None: Class Certifi-
cation of Particular Issues Under Rule 23(c)(4)(A), 2002 UTAH L. REV. 249, 251-54, 266-67. 
But see Laura J. Hines, Challenging the Issue Class Action End-Run, 52 EMORY L.J.  
709, 713-14, 763-64 (2003); see also Laura J. Hines, The Dangerous Allure of the Issue  
Class Action, 79 IND. L.J. 567, 568 (2004) (questioning permissibility and desirability of 
issue classes). 
 271. FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a)(1) (allowing the court to “join for hearing or trial any or all 
matters at issue in the actions”); 9A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2382, at 9-10 (3d ed. 2008). 
 272. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a), (c) (2012); see also In re FMC Corp. Patent Litig., 422 F. Supp. 
1163, 1165 (J.P.M.L. 1976). 
 273. See § 1407(c)(i); Lee et al., supra note 16, at 4. 
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or at least claims, and therefore aggregates individual issues as well 
as common issues.274 Third, aggregation of cases or claims via multi-
district litigation is only for the purpose of pre-trial proceedings and 
does not allow ultimate resolution of common issues via trial.275  
 To overcome these shortcomings, the proposed inter-district coor-
dination procedures are more akin to the related case procedures 
most district courts use for intra-district coordination, except applied 
across district lines. Most district courts require a notice of related 
cases to be filed with the complaint that identifies any other action 
previously filed or currently pending in the same district that, inter 
alia, involves the “determination of the same or substantially related 
or similar question[s] of law and fact” or “would entail substantial 
duplication of labor if heard by different judges.”276 In many districts, 
assignment or transfer of related cases to the same judge is automat-
ic. For example, in the Southern District of California, the clerk is 
tasked with identifying cases that meet the definition of related cas-
es, with identified cases automatically assigned (or reassigned) to the 
judge with the first-filed of the related actions.277 
 The procedures for resolution of these related cases vary depend-
ing on the district, the nature of the cases, and the degree of overlap. 
Sometimes cases are consolidated for all purposes, while other times 
they remain entirely separate with coordination simply allowing a 
single judge to master the issues involved and avoid inconsistent re-
sults. But, importantly for present purposes, it is common in intra-
district related cases for the common issues to be resolved collectively 
in a group proceeding and individual issues in separate individual 
proceedings, with consolidation or reassignment sometimes happen-
ing only for the limited purpose of resolving common issues. For ex-
ample, multiple cases alleging infringement of the same patent pend-
ing in the same district have been reassigned to a single judge only to 
interpret the patent claims.278 Similarly, the Northern District of Cal-
ifornia assigned 200 DirecTV cases to a single judge only to resolve 
the propriety of joinder, determine whether certain statutory provi-
sions allowed private rights of action, and establish the necessary 
showing under various statutes for default judgments.279 
                                                                                                                  
 274. See supra Part V.A.3. 
 275. See § 1407(a); Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 
26, 28 (1998). Common issues can be resolved via summary judgment in multi-district pro-
ceedings or tested via sample or “bellwether” trials. 
 276. C.D. CAL. L.R. 83-1.3.1.1; see also, e.g., S.D. CAL. L.R. 40.1(e)-(j). 
 277. S.D. CAL. L.R. 40.1(e)-(j). 
 278. See, e.g., Kohus v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., Nos. C-1-05-517, C-1-05-671, 2006 WL 
1476209, at *1-2 (S.D. Ohio May 25, 2006). 
 279. In re DIRECTV, Inc., No. C-02-5912-JW, 2004 WL 2645971, at *1, *12 (N.D. Cal. 
July 26, 2004). 
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 In essence, the proposed inter-district coordination applies the tools 
developed for intra-district related case procedures—especially the use 
of automatic reassignment and reassignment for the limited purpose of 
(final) resolution of only common issues—to cases involving similarly 
situated defendants that reach across district boundaries. It also for-
malizes the standards and procedures for related case coordination, 
which in the intra-district context, often are ad hoc and subject to sub-
stantial judicial discretion, and therefore judicial self-interest.  
 Although developed for the needs of defendant aggregation, inter-
district related case coordination may be useful for certain types of 
multi-plaintiff cases that share similarities with multi-defendant 
cases, including the presence of both significant individual and signif-
icant common issues and the inappropriateness of representative 
procedures. For example, mass tort cases, which fit these criteria and 
have faced obstacles to aggregation under existing procedures, may 
benefit from inter-district coordination. Indeed, aspects of inter-
district coordination echo the proposals from the American Law In-
stitute’s Complex Litigation Project in the 1990s, which was largely 
focused on plaintiff aggregation.280  
2.   Mechanics of Inter-District Coordination 
 The proposed inter-district coordination procedures would be ini-
tiated when the plaintiff filed a complaint (probably a form com-
plaint) against each defendant in a chosen district court with juris-
diction and venue over that defendant. The plaintiff also would file a 
notice listing any “related cases” already pending or concurrently 
filed.281 Related cases could be defined generically to include, inter 
alia, cases with a common, or perhaps “significant,” question of fact 
or law.282 Substance-specific aggregation protocols, discussed in more 
detail below, also would be useful to provide more specific definitions 
or guidance as to what constitutes a related case in various substan-
tive areas.283 To prevent serial litigation when it suited the plaintiff’s 
interest, incentives could be provided to name all defendants at once, 
such as a substantially discounted bulk rate filing fee, a penalty or 
moratorium for subsequently filing related cases, or even preclusion 
of related claims that were identifiable and could have been brought 
at the time of original filing.284  
                                                                                                                  
 280. AM. LAW INST., COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT 1-4 (Proposed Final Draft 1993). 
 281. See, e.g., Notice of Designation of Related Civil Cases Pending (D.D.C.), available 
at https://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/dcd/sites/dcd/files/CO932-online.pdf.   
 282. See S.D. CAL. L.R. 40.1(f)-(g). 
 283. See D.D.C. L.R. 40.5(a) (providing different definitions of “related case[s]” for crim-
inal, civil forfeiture, and civil cases). 
 284. Cf. Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 23 (suggesting that procedural tools, like 
preclusion and restitution, can lead to more efficient defense-side outcomes). 
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 The notice of related cases would be filed simultaneously with the 
chosen court and a centralized body—perhaps the Judicial Panel on 
Multidistrict Litigation (JPML). The centralized body would conduct 
a preliminary review to insure the cases actually qualify as related 
cases. If the definition of related cases is clearly specified, this task 
could be assigned to the equivalent of a clerk to reduce costs.285 The 
centralized body would then reassign the related cases to a single 
judge for the limited purpose of resolving common issues. Under ex-
isting multi-district litigation procedures, the choice of judge is at the 
discretion of the JPML and often is subject to briefing and a hear-
ing.286 Because of its automatic application, inter-district coordination 
will involve many more cases than multi-district litigation, and it will 
be infeasible to litigate the identity of the coordinating judge in every 
case. To reduce transaction costs, the identity of the coordinating 
judge should be determined automatically287—perhaps by assigning 
the related cases to a judge in the district with the most related cas-
es, a judge in the district that is geographically closest to the most 
defendants, a judge that has volunteered for coordinated cases either 
generally or in specific substantive areas, a judge that has passed 
some minimal screening for ability to handle complex litigation, or a 
judge with some combination of these factors. 
 Once reassigned for coordination, the coordinating judge would 
develop a coordination plan specifying the common issues, the plan 
for discovery and resolution of the common issues, and the status of 
the individual cases. This coordination plan would involve input from 
the parties and probably a hearing, and the parties would also have 
the chance to seek de-aggregation on limited, specific grounds (e.g., 
although the same patent is involved, totally different claims are as-
serted against each defendant). The coordinating judge could stay 
proceedings in the individual cases pending outcome of the common 
issues, especially where the common issues could be dispositive of all 
cases (e.g., patent invalidity). In other circumstances, individual is-
sues may be litigated simultaneously with the coordinated proceed-
ings, such as when one patent has been asserted against many de-
fendants but a second patent is asserted individually against just one 
defendant. Once the common issues have been resolved, the related 
cases would be returned to the individually chosen districts for reso-
                                                                                                                  
 285. See S.D. CAL. L.R. 40.1(g)-(h) (requiring clerk to identify related cases and prepare 
an order for judge’s signature).  
 286. See Margaret S. Williams & Tracey E. George, Who Will Manage Complex Civil 
Litigation? The Decision to Transfer and Consolidate Multidistrict Litigation, 10-11, 23-24 
(July 1, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1633703. 
 287. Cf. S.D. CAL. L.R. 40.1(h)-(i) (assigning related cases to the judge with the “low-
numbered” case). The low-number rule would not work for inter-district coordination be-
cause plaintiffs could consistently choose the most plaintiff-friendly districts simply by 
filing the first of the related cases in that district. 
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lution of individual issues.288 Any common issues resolved in the co-
ordinated proceedings would have law of the case or collateral estop-
pel effect in the individual proceedings.289 
 To reduce litigation costs, minimize disputes over the coordination 
plan, and constrain judicial variability and self-interest, presump-
tively binding guidelines could be used to specify what constitutes a 
common issue appropriate for coordinated resolution, what consti-
tutes an individual issue not appropriate for coordinated resolution, 
in what circumstances to stay individual proceedings, how to struc-
ture discovery, and how to handle trials. Although trans-substantive 
guidelines would help, substance-specific protocols would allow 
greater specificity and detail and be preferable, at least for substan-
tive areas that repeatedly produce multi-defendant cases (e.g., patent 
litigation or internet file-sharing).290  
 For example, under a patent-specific protocol, a related case could 
be defined as one alleging infringement of the same patent or per-
haps patents that issued from a common application. The common 
issues would include interpretation of the patent (i.e., “claim con-
struction”), whether the patent is invalid for failing to meet the stat-
utory requirements,291 defenses related to the patentee’s conduct in 
the Patent Office (e.g., “inequitable conduct”), and maybe infringe-
ment issues in those cases where they are likely to be identical for 
each defendant.292 As for structure, the patent-specific protocol could 
provide for an early claim construction hearing to resolve the scope of 
the patent,293 then discovery limited to invalidity and inequitable 
conduct issues, and finally trial of invalidity and inequitable conduct. 
Because the common defenses are potentially case-dispositive and 
therefore can save the costs from discovery and trial on infringement, 
                                                                                                                  
 288. Cf. In re DIRECTV, Inc., No. C-02-5912-JW, 2004 WL 2645971, at *12 (N.D. Cal. 
July 26, 2004) (referring cases back to originating judge after resolving certain common 
issues on a district-wide coordinated basis). 
 289. See Romberg, supra note 270, at 254 (similar suggestion for issue class actions). 
 290. Despite the trans-substantive nature of most procedural rules, see Paul D. Car-
rington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of the 
Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067, 2067 
(1989), substance-specific procedures are increasingly common in complex areas, including 
Patent Local Rules, see, e.g., N.D. CAL. PATENT L.R., available at http://www.cand. 
uscourts.gov/localrules/patent, guidelines from court advisory councils on discovery and 
case management, see Jason Rantanen, Model Order Addressing Numerosity of Claims and 
Prior Art [UPDATED], PATENTLYO (July 26, 2013), http://www.patentlyo.com/ 
patent/2013/07/model-order-addressing-numerosity-of-claims-and-prior-art.html, and the 
ad hoc guidelines on the showing required for a DirecTV default judgment created by the 
Northern District of California, see In re DIRECTV, Inc., 2004 WL 2645971, at *6-11. 
 291. Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 23, at 1484-86 (classifying patent law defenses 
as individual or common). 
 292. See Taylor, supra note 7, at 717-19. 
 293. See, e.g., N.D. CAL. PATENT L.R. 4 (setting procedures for early claim construc-
tion hearing). 
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damages, and other individual issues—individual proceedings gener-
ally should be stayed until after the common issues are resolved,294 or 
at least until claim construction is resolved.295 
C.   Potential Obstacles to Inter-District Coordination 
 A benefit of inter-district coordination is that it is a hybrid of two 
well-established procedures (multi-district litigation and intra-district 
related case coordination) and therefore poses minimal implementa-
tion problems. This Section considers a few implementation obstacles. 
1.   Practical Obstacles: Free Riding 
 Although common defenses are public goods and raise the possibil-
ity of free riding with or without aggregation,296 aggregation may ac-
centuate the problem. In individual litigation, each defendant must 
expend money and effort to develop its defenses, including common 
defenses; if it does not, it loses.297 But aggregated defendants prevail 
when the group succeeds on a common defense, regardless of their 
contribution. Thus, in theory, each defendant’s incentive is to under-
invest in the common defense, relying on other defendants to develop 
defenses that also allow the free-riding defendant to escape liability.298  
Free riding poses fewer obstacles to aggregation of similarly situ-
ated plaintiffs because successful aggregated claims create a common 
pool of money from which to pay the lawyers, incentivizing lawyers to 
vigorously pursue the common cause.299 Aggregated defenses create 
no common fund, but rather require expenditures to avoid greater 
expenditures.300 To overcome the free-riding problem for aggregated 
defendants, Hamdani and Klement proposed one-way fee-shifting, 
                                                                                                                  
 294. See Ford, supra note 156, at 119-22 (suggesting resolving invalidity first for  
substantive reasons). 
 295. Claim construction is the single most important event in patent cases and is often 
case-dispositive. See Greg Reilly, Judicial Capacities and Patent Claim Construction: An 
Ordinary Reader Standard, 20 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) 
(manuscript at 24-25), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=2310026. 
 296. See supra Part IV.B. 
 297. An individual defendant may be able to free ride if it is sued after another defend-
ant has prevailed on a common defense, see Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 23, at 1518, 
or is part of a joint defense group sharing information and work product, see Erichson, 
supra note 20, at 401-08. Moreover, a rational defendant in individual litigation may focus on 
individual defenses to avoid creating a common good. See Ford, supra note 156, at 109-12. 
 298. See Hamdani & Klement, supra note 4, at 712. 
 299. See Judith Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions Creating Subsi-
dies and Awarding Fees and Costs in Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. 
REV. 2119, 2139-40 (2000).  
 300. See Hamdani & Klement, supra note 4, at 715. 
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where a losing plaintiff would pay the defendants’ fees.301 However, 
most cases settle.302 A settlement for aggregated plaintiffs still cre-
ates a common fund to pay the lawyers, but a settlement for aggre-
gated defendants neither creates a common fund nor results in a los-
ing plaintiff. Hamdani and Klement would have the plaintiff pay fees 
when the defendants prevail or settle,303 even though the settlement 
could reflect the strength of the plaintiff’s case, not its weakness. 
This could deter plaintiffs from bringing meritorious claims or reduce 
settlements, increasing costs and congestion in the courts. 
 Free riding may not pose as great an obstacle to inter-district co-
ordination as may be first thought. Practitioners involved in multi-
defendant litigation, at least in higher stakes cases like patent litiga-
tion, suggest free riding is less of a problem than “over-riding,” that 
is, each defendant insisting on pursuing its preferred strategies and 
being involved in or taking the lead on every aspect of the litiga-
tion.304 The incentive for defense lawyers to over-ride is clear: it max-
imizes their billable hour fees. Over-riding may be rational for de-
fendants themselves when aggregation occurs via non-representative 
procedures and each defendant can settle separately. If other defend-
ants settle, a free-riding defendant would be left exposed to liability 
without having developed a defense. In fact, practitioners report 
“plaintiffs often offer the most favorable settlements to the defend-
ants that are best prepared, to remove them from the case and focus 
on the more vulnerable parties.”305 Even if not perfectly rational, cli-
ents may permit over-riding because of monitoring deficiencies or the 
influence and self-interested advice of the lawyers. Finally, because 
of loss aversion, defendants will tend to pay more in defense than 
they rationally should, and because of self-serving bias, defendants 
will overvalue their own strategies and abilities (or the wisdom of 
their choice of counsel) and be unwilling to sacrifice their defense to 
perceived “weaker” defendants or lawyers.  
 Even in lower stakes cases, like the DirecTV and internet file-
sharing cases, one or more defendants have been willing to take on 
                                                                                                                  
 301. Id. at 715-17; see also Netto, supra note 21, at 112-16 (also supporting fee-shifting 
in part to motivate attorneys to present defenses instead of settling). 
 302. Jonathan D. Glater, Study Finds Settling Is Better than Going to Trial, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 7, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/08/business/08law.html?_r=1& 
(“The vast majority of cases do settle — from 80 to 92 percent by some estimates . . . .”). 
 303. Hamdani & Klement, supra note 4, at 715-17. 
 304. See, e.g., Irene C. Warshauer et al., Methods to Effectively Manage Complex Multi-
Party Disputes, 14A ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. FOUND. (SPECIAL INST. ON RESOL. & AVOIDANCE 
OF DISPUTES) 3, 3-15, 20 (1984); Baghdassarian & Frankel, supra note 151. 
 305. Baghdassarian & Frankel, supra note 151; see, e.g., Warshauer et al., supra note 
304, at 3-19.  
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common issues on behalf of all defendants.306 Aggregation probably 
makes it more likely that the common defense will be developed in 
low-stakes cases because it offers greater opportunities to fund de-
fense lawyers than individual litigation. For example, aggregation 
may encourage involvement by public interest groups whose substan-
tive interests line up with the defendants—such as the open-access 
movement in intellectual property cases—by lowering the required 
costs and effort and raising the stakes and prominence.307 Alterna-
tively, defense lawyers could collect an inventory of cases, charging 
each defendant a small amount but creating a respectable war 
chest.308 For example, if a defense lawyer can sign up 100 clients for a 
flat fee of $1000,309 the $100,000 total should allow a better common 
defense than any defendant could put on in individual litigation. 
 Finally, free riders in aggregate litigation do not make participat-
ing defendants worse off than in individual litigation, as participat-
ing defendants would likely litigate the same common issues at vir-
tually the same cost without aggregation.310 To the extent that free 
riding is seen as unfair or creating under-investment in common de-
fenses, mechanisms could be used to encourage or force all defend-
ants to contribute where feasible.311 
2.   Statutory and Constitutional Obstacles 
 Much of the proposed inter-district coordination procedure can be 
implemented under the JPML’s existing rulemaking authority,312 in-
cluding the procedures for choosing a coordinating judge and the de-
velopment of general and substance-specific protocols. However, in-
ter-district coordination cannot be fully implemented without 
                                                                                                                  
 306. See, e.g., Arista Records, LLC v. Does 1–11, No. 1:07–CV–2828, 2008 WL 4823160, 
at *1-2 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 3, 2008) (noting that Defendant Doe #9 had entered an appearance 
via counsel and filed a motion “to dismiss all Doe Defendants except Defendant Doe # 1” for 
improper joinder); In re DIRECTV, Inc., No. C-02-5912-JW, 2004 WL 2645971, at *1 (N.D. 
Cal. July 26, 2004) (noting that attorneys appeared on behalf of defendants at hearing on 
joinder and DirecTV’s required prima facie showing). 
 307. Cf. Hamdani & Klement, supra note 4, at 717-18 (noting that class defense mech-
anisms could provide additional funding for public interest organizations). 
 308. See DirecTV, Inc. v. Beecher, 296 F. Supp. 2d 937, 939 (S.D. Ind. 2004) (“Many of the 
defendants in the several cases in this court have banded together for a common defense.”). 
 309. People with minimal resources regularly pay $1000 or more to defend DUI charg-
es. See, e.g., Lisa Ellis, What It Costs for a DUI Attorney, WHAT IT COSTS, http://business. 
whatitcosts.com/dui-attorney.htm (last visited July 25, 2014). 
 310. See Defendant Class Actions, supra note 20, at 648. Coordination costs are unlike-
ly to be significant if other defendants are free riding. 
 311. See Ford, supra note 156155, at 123 (proposing accounting action for defendants 
who prevail on a common defense to recover from other potential defendants); Parchomov-
sky & Stein, supra note 23, at 1520-24.  
 312. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(f) (2012) (“The panel may prescribe rules for the conduct of its 
business not inconsistent with Acts of Congress and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”). 
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amendments to the multi-district litigation statute to permit issue-
only coordination since the JPML has interpreted the statute as lim-
ited to coordination of entire claims.313 Likewise, statutory amend-
ments would be necessary to implement automatic coordination pro-
cedures, as the statute currently requires notice and a hearing before 
transfer,314 and to allow trial of common issues in the consolidated 
proceedings, since the statutory language and Supreme Court prece-
dent require remand at the end of pre-trial proceedings.315  
Inter-district coordination does not appear to raise any novel con-
stitutional issues. Although the coordinating forum may not other-
wise have personal jurisdiction and venue over all defendants, “Con-
gress may, consistent with the due process clause, enact legislation 
authorizing the federal courts to exercise nationwide personal juris-
diction,” which it did in the multi-district litigation statute.316 Like-
wise, issue-only aggregation does not run afoul of the Seventh 
Amendment’s guarantee that “no fact tried by a jury, shall be other-
wise re-examined in any Court of the United States . . . .”317 Common 
legal issues do not implicate the Seventh Amendment, and even for 
common issues subject to a jury trial, the Seventh Amendment only 
bars revisiting of the same issue, not simply an overlap in evidence 
presented to two juries.318 If common issues are properly defined by 
the coordinating judge and properly given preclusive effect in indi-
                                                                                                                  
 313. See supra Part V.A.3. 
 314. See § 1407(c). 
 315. See § 1407(a); Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 
26, 40 (1998).  
 316. In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig. MDL No. 381, 818 F.2d 145, 163 (2d. Cir. 
1987) (absent class members); see also In re FMC Corp. Patent Litig., 422 F. Supp. 1163, 
1165 (J.P.M.L. 1976) (defendants). This is clearly true for cases subject to federal question 
jurisdiction. In these cases, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment applies and 
requires only minimum contacts with the United States as a whole. See 4 CHARLES ALAN 
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1068.1, at 597-602, 
612 (3d ed. 2002). By contrast, in diversity cases, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment applies; allowing a federal, nationwide jurisdiction statute to trump the state-
specific minimum contacts analysis required in state courts would seem to run afoul of the 
Erie Doctrine. Id. § 1068.1, at 592. Yet, personal jurisdiction has not proven an obstacle to 
multi-district litigation, even in diversity cases. See Agent Orange, 818 F.2d at 152, 163. 
For aggregated defendants, personal jurisdiction may prove more problematic in diversity 
cases because of the heightened due process concerns for defendants as compared to plain-
tiffs. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 810-11 (1985). At the very least, 
personal jurisdiction issues are likely to receive more attention than they have received in 
multi-district litigation if inter-district related case coordination is used in diversity cases. 
 317. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
 318. See Romberg, supra note 270, at 324-25. For a detailed consideration of the Sev-
enth Amendment issue in the context of issue class actions, see Patrick Woolley, Mass Tort 
Litigation and the Seventh Amendment Reexamination Clause, 83 IOWA L. REV. 499 (1998). 
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vidual litigation, there is no risk that the individual jury would re-
consider issues resolved by the coordinated jury.319 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 This Article has explored the overlooked puzzle of defendant ag-
gregation: the opposition of defendants, courts, and policymakers to 
aggregation of similarly situated defendants despite the theoretical 
benefits it offers courts and the judicial system. Defendants’ opposi-
tion is more easily explained, at least for some defendants and some 
types of cases. Yet, these explanations are weaker and less broadly 
applicable than may be commonly assumed. Systemic opposition likely 
results from some combination of improper merits or policy determina-
tions, capture by defendant interests, and a narrow focus on a judge’s 
own self-interest rather than that of the judicial system as a whole.  
 The need for aggregation of similarly situated defendants to date 
has largely arisen in technology cases—patent cases, internet  
file-sharing copyright litigation, and satellite television piracy—but 
is likely to spread to other areas in the coming years as a result  
of mass communications that increase the ability of dispersed people 
to injure a single plaintiff.320 Others have noted the parallels between 
the rise of mass communications and defendant aggregation in the 
21st century and the rise of mass production and a national economy 
and plaintiff aggregation in the mid-20th century.321 Overlooked, 
however, is that the increased demand for plaintiff aggregation in  
the 1950s and 1960s sparked procedural innovation that resulted in 
new multi-district litigation procedures322 and substantially revised 
class action procedures.323 The modern demand for defendant aggre-
gation similarly necessitates procedural innovation that will over-
come the obstacles created by defendant and judicial self-interest and 
cognitive limitations.  
 This Article takes a first step in that direction and proposes an 
inter-district related case coordination procedure. The debate going 
forward should be about how to better tailor a procedure for the 
needs of defendant aggregation, not whether, or how well, aggrega-
tion of similarly situated defendants fits into the boxes of existing 
procedures largely crafted for aggregating plaintiffs. 
  
                                                                                                                  
 319. See Romberg, supra note 270, at 324-25 (reaching a similar conclusion in the con-
text of issue class actions). 
 320. See Hamdani & Klement, supra note 4, at 741; Netto, supra note 21, at 61-62. 
 321. See Hamdani & Klement, supra note 4, at 741; Netto, supra note 21, at 61. 
 322. See Resnik, supra note 24, at 30-33 (describing the history of the 1968 enactment 
of the multi-district litigation statute). 
 323. See id. at 9-17 (describing the history of the 1966 revisions to class action procedures). 
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